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ECONOMICS UPSIDE-DOWN: LOW-PRICE GUARANTEES
AS MECHANISMS FOR FACILITATING
TACIT COLLUSION
MARK T.L. SARGENTt
INTRODUCTION
In a recent newspaper advertisement, Circuit City, a regional
consumer electronics retail chain prominent in the northeastern
United States, offered potential customers the following low-price
guarantee ("LPG"):
For every product we sell, we'll beat any legitimate price from a
local store stocking the same new item in a factory-sealed box.
Even after your purchase, if you find a lower price within 30 days,
including our own sale prices, we'll refund 110% of the differ-
ence.
1
a
Many of Circuit City's competitors and other consumer electronics
retailers throughout the Northeast have offered similar guarantees.
2
Although at first glance these LPGs might appear to be a simple
marketing ploy or even a boon to consumers, in reality they might
be used as mechanisms for facilitating tacit collusion.3 In fact,
t B.A. 1990, University of Dayton; A.M. (Economics) Candidate 1993, J.D.
Candidate 1995, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Gang Phillip Liu for
introducing me to the collusive potential of competitor-based pricing mechanisms.
I would also like to thankJ. David Brown and Henry Ma for reading an earlier draft,
and my colleagues on the Law Review, particularly those in the Comments Office, for
making many useful suggestions. The arguments in this Comment were heavily
influenced by my participation in the Law School's Law and Economics of Antitrust
and Corporate Law class taught by Professor Ed Rock and Dr. Michael Wachter.
Finally, this Comment is dedicated to my parents, who have inspired my educational
pursuits.
I PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 27, 1992, at B22 (Circuit City advertisement).
2 See N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A12-13 (Sixth Avenue Electronics advertise-
ment) (describing a "Best Price Plus" policy providing customers who bring in a
competitor's ad offering a lower price with a free extended warranty for their
purchases) [hereinafter Sixth Avenue Electronics]; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at A20-
21 (Wiz Home Entertainment Centers advertisement) (stating "[biring in any of our
competitor's [sic] ads and we will beat the price plus 10% of the difference in price
or it's yours free!") [hereinafter Wiz]; PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 6, 1992, advertising
insert (American Appliance advertisement) (stating a "double the difference" price
guarantee); PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 29, 1992, at B8 (Silo advertisement) (noting that
"[s]hould you purchase something from us, then find it for less in the next 30 days,
we'll gladly give you the difference - plus 10%").
s See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (defining tacit collusion and
distinguishing it from overt collusion).
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LPGs provide a particularly potent instrument for implementing
tacit collusion and offer little offsetting economic benefit. In light
of this analysis, this Comment explains why courts, scholars, and
antitrust enforcement officials should scrutinize the use of LPGs to
ensure that they are not utilized for collusive purposes. The
Comment then evaluates the possibility of prosecuting attempts to
facilitate tacit collusion via LPGs under current antitrust laws.
Finally, the Comment concludes by calling on legislators, regulators,
and courts to modify and clarify existing antitrust laws to correct
defects in applying existing statutory prohibitions on collusion to
cases involving LPGs.
I. LOW-PRICE GUARANTEES AND THE CONSUMER
RETAILING MARKET
a
A. Definition of a Low-Price Guarantee
For the purposes of this Comment, a low-price guarantee is
defined as a promise by a firm to refund to a customer an amount
in excess of 100% of the difference between the firm's price and the
prices charged by the firm's competitors. As a result, policies that
merely guarantee that a firm's prices are the lowest available, also
known as "meeting-the-competition clauses,"4 are not considered
LPGs in the analysis which follows. While such guaranteed lowest
price policies might have anticompetitive effects,5 they are less
effective at facilitating tacit collusion than policies which refund
more than 100% of the price difference.
6
Furthermore, some firms offer "modified" LPGs under which
they offer to match any competitor's price and will give any
customer providing evidence of a lower price a non-cash premium.
The pricing policy followed by Sixth Avenue Electronics, for
4 See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
5 See Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUcTuRE 265, 279-82 (Joseph E.
Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986) (defining meeting-the-competition clauses
and explaining their collusive applications when used individually or in concert with
other pricing policies); Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust
Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REV. 887, 934-35
(discussing meet-or-release clauses, which are very similar to meeting-the-competition
clauses).
6 This is true because the "signal" sent by LPG pricing policies is "stronger" than
that sent by guaranteed lowest price policies. See infra notes 102-07 and accompany-
ing text.
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example, consists of an offer to match competitors' prices and to
provide an extended warranty at no extra charge to any customer
who brings in a competitor's ad with a lower price for the product
purchased. 7 Although this and other similar pricing policies qualify
as LPGs given the definition advanced above, they operate in a
slightly different manner from "pure" LPGs in which the guarantee
premium is a cash amount directly related to the difference between
the guarantor's and a competitor's prices. In particular, if the non-
cash premium is not considered sufficiently valuable by consumers,
they might decide to forego enforcing the guarantee and instead
might merely purchase from the retailer with the lowest price
regardless of any guarantee. As explained below, 8 the effectiveness
of LPGs as a mechanism for facilitating tacit collusion depends, in
part, on their ability to signal prices. If LPGs are not utilized by
consumers, however, then the signals needed to sustain a collusive
outcome may be weakened. While the discussion and examples
provided in this Comment focus on pure LPGs, the conclusions
drawn can easily be extended to modified LPGs if this change in
signal strength is taken into account.
B. The Example of Consumer Electronics Retailing
While many parts of this Comment refer to the use of LPGs by
consumer electronics retailers, the manner in which LPGs can be
used to facilitate tacit collusion is in no way limited to this narrow
industry. In fact, the consumer electronics retailing industry lacks
many of the features most conducive to tacit collusion, 9 making it
a less than ideal example. The consumer electronics context is
discussed in this Comment, however, because LPGs are most visible
in this environment and because retailing provides a clear paradigm
for explaining the operation of LPGs. In addition, while the
consumer electronics retailing industry does lack some of the
properties which encourage the use of tacit collusion, as a theoreti-
7 See Sixth Avenue Electronics, supra note 2, at A12-13.
8 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
9 See infra part IV.C.2. (detailing industry characteristics that facilitate collusion).
In particular, the consumer electronics retailing industry seems susceptible to vertical
profit dissipation. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (defining and explaining
the relevance of vertical profit dissipation). In addition, the absolute value of the
price elasticity of demand for consumer electronics may exceed unity, meaning that
an increase in prices will decrease total revenue in the industry. See infra notes 133-35
and accompanying text (defining and explaining the relevance of demand elasticities).
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cal and practical matter LPGs could still be used to establish and
enforce a silent conspiracy in related industries.
LPGs are not unique to the consumer electronics industry. In
fact, some sporting goods stores have recently advertised LPGs.
10
Furthermore, while LPGs seem most prevalent in the retailing
context, there is no reason why they might not be used at the
wholesale level or in other transactions between businesses. In
essence, the collusive potential of LPGs extends to all industries.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A. Competitive Equilibrium
Although a detailed discussion of the evils of collusion is beyond
the scope of this Comment,11 in order to understand the harm
caused by using LPGs to facilitate tacit collusion one should have a
basic understanding of the benefits of competition and the costs of
monopoly.
American economic policy is premised on the relative efficiency
of free-market policies. This position follows from the belief that
the actual markets in the American economy contain many of the
elements required for perfect competition. Under the traditional
competitive market model, a large number of small, identical, and
independent firms produce a single homogeneous product for a
large number of independent consumers. 12 In addition, transac-
tion costs, externalities, and barriers to entry are assumed to be
nonexistent.13 While no one actually believes that these condi-
tions exist in the real world, American antitrust and economic
policies hold up the competitive model as an ideal, a goal which the
law should help to realize. Under these conditions, firms are price
takers: they can sell as much as they can produce at the market
10 See PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1992, advertising insert (Modell's Sporting
Goods) ("We Will Beat Any Ad ... Any Day ... And Refund 25% Of The
Difference!") (ellipses in original).
11 RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., EcONoMics 224-315 (9th ed. 1990), and CAMPBELL
R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 543-629 (10th ed. 1987), provide particularly clear
explanations of market structure.
12 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 225-26; MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 544-
45.
13 See LIPsEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 227; MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 545,569-
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price, but they are unable to influence the market price by changing
their output.
14
In a competitive environment, the market price moves to the
level required to equilibrate supply and demand. The equilibrium
which results from this process has several favorable properties.
First, the economy is characterized by productive efficiency.
15
That is, each unit of output produced at the equilibrium will be
produced in the least costly manner possible.1 6  Second, the
equilibrium will be allocatively efficient; the product mix produced
by firms will correspond to that most desired by consumers.
17
Allocative efficiency results because the profit-maximizing firms will
produce up to the point where the marginal cost and marginal
revenue of producing one additional unit of output are equal.
18
Since, by assumption, there are no externalities, the marginal cost
of production for each firm reflects the marginal cost of production
to society. In addition, since firms are price takers, the marginal
revenue of producing another unit must be equal to the market
price. As a result, because marginal costs are equal to marginal
revenue at equilibrium, price will be equal to marginal cost.
19
Therefore, the price of a unit of output will reflect the cost to
society of producing the good. This is why competitive economies
are allocatively efficient.20 Note that this allocative efficiency
occurs as the result of businesses and consumers each seeking to
maximize their own self-interests; no social planning is necessary to
maximize society's welfare.
21
One other feature of competitive equilibria is worthy of note.
At any stable, long-term competitive equilibrium, the industry must
be making zero economic profits22 because there are no barriers
14 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 226; MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 545.
15 See MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 566.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 230; MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 552.
19 That is, since price is always equal to marginal revenue (p = mr), and since
marginal cost equals marginal revenue in equilibrium (mc = mr), then by transitivity,
price is equal to marginal cost in equilibrium (p = mc).
20 See MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 566-67. The fact that competitive
equilibrium maximizes society's welfare is sometimes called the "First Theorem of
Welfare Economics." See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 200 (2d ed.
1984) (using "Walrasian equilibrium" to refer to competitive equilibrium). Other
texts refer to it as the "Theorem of the Invisible Hand" in deference to Adam Smith.
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMIcS 44 (1988).
21 See MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 568.
22 Economic profit is defined as "[t]he difference between the revenues received
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to entering the industry. Thus, if an industry is profitable, new
firms will join it, increasing industry output and pushing down
prices until no economic profits remain.
23
B. The Harm of Monopoly
While the welfare-maximizing properties associated with perfect
competition are attractive, in reality the strong assumptions
demanded of the competitive model often are not present.24 The
competitive model, for example, was premised on the presence of
a large number of firms. In some markets, however, there may be
only one firm, a monopoly. In this case, the monopolist will not be
a price taker; it will be able to influence the market price by varying
its output.25 In fact, the monopolist will realize that adding an
additional unit of output decreases the market price for all units
sold.26 As a result, the marginal revenue gained from producing
one more unit of output is less than the market price.27 There-
fore, when the monopolist maximizes its profits by equating
marginal revenue with marginal cost, the equilibrium price will be
above marginal cost. In essence, there is underprovision of output
in a monopolized market because the benefits to society gained by
extra output exceed the cost of production.
28
While in the short run a monopolist will earn positive economic
profits, without barriers preventing new firms from entering the
industry the monopolist's long-term fate is identical to that of the
competitive industry. Other firms will seek to earn the positive
economic profits found in the monopolized industry and prices will
from the sale of output and the opportunity cost of the inputs used to make the
output." LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 960. Note that this differs from the
definition of profit used by accountants. See id. at 184-88. Given the assumption that
all firms are identical, this means that no firm is making economic profit.
23 See id. at 234.
24 Although most economists believe that monopolies are harmful, a distinct
minority argues that the benefits of monopolization often exceed the costs. See
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (3d ed. 1950)
(arguing that monopoly profits provide a strong incentive for technological progress);
see alsoJOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 86-88 (1956) (suggesting
that oligopolies provide the most fertile environment for inducing technical change
since firms in oligopolistic industries have both the money and incentive to invest in
research and development).
25 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 246 (noting that the monopolist faces a
trade-off between price and quantity).
26 See id. at 247.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 295.
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fall until economic profits drop to zero, terminating the incentive
for new entry.29 As a result, the successful monopolist must be
able to prevent entry into its industry. The monopolist might, for
example, possess a patent which entitles it to prohibit other firms
from producing similar products.30 Alternatively, other statutory
restrictions might forbid entry.
3 1
Most typically, however, monopoly status persists because the
good's production process is characterized by economies of
scale.3 2 Monopolies of this type, often called "natural monopo-
lies," are able to produce at very low per-unit costs by reaping the
benefits of economies of scale. In this environment, other firms will
not enter the industry because they could not achieve the large sales
needed to justify the massive output required to benefit from the
economies of scale.3 3 In fact, natural monopolies provide an
efficiency argument for allowing one firm to produce all output,
since doing so ensures that the cost of production is minimized.,
3 4
This is why many public utilities are permitted to exist as monopo-
lies. They are then regulated to prevent them from charging the
prices associated with unbridled monopolists.3 5 In the absence of
such regulation, however, a monopolist who possesses a large cost
advantage over its potential competitors will be able to deter entry
and earn positive economic profits even in the long run. This is
because the monopolist will be able to use "predatory pricing"
policies.3 6  Pursuant to such policies, the instant a new entrant
29 See id. at 250.
30 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 20, at 38. For a detailed economic evaluation
of the patent system, see F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 439-58 (2d ed. 1980).
31 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that the Civil Aeronautics
Board refused to allow airlines to add service to some major passenger routes until
the mid-1970s).
32 See id.; LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 250 (discussing natural monopolies).
Economies of scale refer to the reduction of costs per unit of output resulting from
an increase in output. See id. at 960.
33 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 250.
34 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 20, at 38.
35 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 305, 307.08 (discussing public utility
regulation of natural monopolies).
-6 For detailed discussions of the legality of predatory pricing and proposed legal
rules to combat it, see Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Predatoty Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975); Oliver E.
Williamson, Predatoty Pricing. A Strategic And Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 284
(1977); see also 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 1 711 (1978)
(discussing various facets of predatory pricing). Some scholars refer to predatory
pricing as "limit pricing." See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 233-36; Salop, supra note 5,
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attempts to join the industry, the monopolist will cut prices to a
level where the new entrant realizes unsustainable losses.3 7 In
fact, a credible threat to cut prices might be sufficient to deter entry
by new firms.38 Alternatively, a monopolist might maintain its
market share through heavy advertising or brand recognition.
3 9
Although preventing other firms from entering an industry is
difficult, a monopolist that accomplishes this goal is rewarded with
large economic profits.
C. Cartel Theoy
Just as a single firm that dominates an industry might attempt
to restrict output in an effort to raise prices and increase profits, a
group of firms can form a cartel with the same objective. Firms
seeking to form a cartel to raise prices above their competitive levels
face three challenges.40 First, they must create a consensus within
the cartel as to the target price. Second, they must establish a
course of action to move prices from their competitive levels to the
higher target price. Third, they must maintain prices at the target
level, which requires, among other things, deterring entry.
Although the brevity of this list of challenges might suggest that
forming a collusive cartel is easy, in reality accomplishing any one
at 282-83.
37 See LIPsEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 250.
38 See id.; Salop, supra note 5, at 282-83 (describing the Bain/Sylos-Labini model
of limit pricing as a deterrent to entry); see also SCHERER, supra note 30, at 336-37
(1980) (noting that Standard Oil's threat of renewed price warfare probably deterred
some potential entrants from joining the petroleum refining industry in the late
1800s).
39 See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 381 ("[A]dvertising and other forms of image
differentiation can confer monopoly power upon the firms using them."). Claims that
a firm has gained a monopolistic advantage through advertising and brand
recognition have actually been litigated. See id. at -381-82; see, e.g., Borden, Inc. v.
FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 511 (6th Cir. 1982) (discussing the monopolistic advantage of
Borden's ReaLemon brand reconstituted lemon juice that allowed it to capture 80%
of the reconstituted lemon juice market despite a price 30% higher than its closest
competitor).
40 See Salop, supra note 5, at 266. Scholars characterize the challenges faced by
cartels in different ways. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theoly
of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295, 296 (1987) (suggesting that price
and output coordination requires three steps: agreeing, detecting breaches of the
agreement, and punishing breaches); Clark, supra note 5, at 891 (listing two steps:
reaching a consensus and then enforcing it); George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared
Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 445 (1982) (listing two steps:
establishing a consensus and promoting "mutual confidence that there will be
adherence to these decisions").
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of the three tasks is extremely difficult. Overcoming all three
challenges in concert is a daunting objective. This is particularly
true since any agreements made in an effort to collude cannot be
enforced in a court of law since collusion is illegal.41 In fact,
collusion is so difficult to achieve that even legal cartels have
trouble maintaining collusive outcomes.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
provides a concise case study.42 In 1973, OPEC members agreed
upon quotas for oil output. The cartel then restricted output in an
effort to raise prices and profits. Though this effort was initially
successful, after several years the increased profits in the industry
attracted new entrants from non-OPEC countries. Furthermore,
consumers adapted to higher oil prices by switching to smaller cars
and adding more effective insulation to homes heated by oil
furnaces. Researchers quickened development of solar and
geothermal power to provide alternative sources of energy. Finally,
OPEC members began to violate their quotas as each nation
abandoned the cartel's goals to maximize its own revenue. By 1986
the cartel neared total collapse, and the inflation-adjusted price of
oil fell to its pre-collusive levels.
As the OPEC example illustrates, each of the three tasks
required to establish an effective cartel provides an onerous
challenge. Certain industry features may further complicate these
chores. Cartel members might have difficulty reaching a consensus
if the industry has a large number of firms, the firms are heteroge-
neous, 43 the product specifications vary within the industry,44 or
41 Legal prohibitions of collusion are discussed infra part V.
42 This description of the decline of OPEC is a paraphrase of LIPsEY ET AL., supra
note 11, at 275-76. See also MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 629 (offering a similar
portrayal).
43 The greater the number of firms, the more communication is necessary to
establish a cartel. This is especially true if each firm has a small share of the market.
In a more concentrated industry, a cartel comprised of relatively few firms with a
large share of the market may be successful. See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 199-200
(noting that the number and size of firms in a market influences coordination
problems); Clark, supra note 5, at 895 (noting that developing a consensus becomes
more difficult as the number of firms increases); Hay, supra note 40, at 447 ("The
larger the number of firms and the greater their variance in size, the more likely that
nontrivial cost differences among firms will exist, thereby complicating the problem
of calculating the optimal industry price.").
""When products are heterogeneously differentiated, the terms of rivalry become
multidimensional, and the coordination problem grows in complexity by leaps and
bounds." SCHERER, supra note 30, at 200; see id. at 200-05; Clark, supra note 5, at 896
(noting that "if consumers perceive differences in product quality, then price
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the industry is characterized by nonprice competition.45 This last
factor is particularly important. In most industries, price is only
one of many factors considered by customers. Firms might also
compete on quality, service, level of advertising, or other factors.
This complicates the effort to reach a consensus because the cartel
members must forge an agreement that takes all of these factors
into account.
The cartel's task of raising prices to a collusive level is also
difficult. In many industries, firms agree to long-term contracts that
fix prices and promise to supply certain quantities of output.
Reneging on these commitments in order to join a cartel would
expose a firm to legal liability. In addition, transactions in some
industries occur infrequently, so any move toward super-competitive
prices would take a long time. This might foster within the cartel
the belief that the agreed upon consensus is being violated. 6
In the event that the first two obstacles to collusion are
overcome, the third task-maintaining the cartel-presents the
greatest challenge. The cartel's initial success at raising profits will
attract new entrants. Similarly, the increase in prices creates the
incentive for the development of substitutes for the cartelized
product. The greatest threat to the cartel's stability, however, comes
from within. Once the cartel has increased prices beyond their
competitive level by reducing output, each firm will have an
incentive to violate its quota.47 Although unanimous adherence
to the collusive consensus might maximize the industry's profits, any
given member of the cartel might maximize its individual profits by
cutting prices and increasing output if the other firms in the cartel
continue to play their roles in the collusive equilibrium.
48
differentials may be needed to produce a stable market equilibrium"); Hay, supra note
40, at 448-50 (noting that multiple prices might be needed if the products are
differentiated).
45 "The tendency toward joint maximization of profits is greater when nonprice
rivalry is absent or limited." LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 277 (emphasis omitted);
cf. MCCONNELL, supra note 11, at 622-23 (suggesting that price collusion is often
accompanied by nonprice competition).
46 Cf. Hay, supra note 40, at 450 (noting that in industries with few sales per year,
each of which accounts for a sizeable portion of annual income, there will be greater
incentive to cheat).
47 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 273-74 (calling this the "Oligopolist's
Dilemma" and providing a game-theoretic model of duopoly).
48 In game-theoretic terms, an outcome where all firms adhere to the collusive
agreement is not a Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium occurs when each player
in a game chooses a strategy that, given the strategies of the other players, maximizes
its payoff. That is, each player's strategy is the best response to the other players'
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Faced with this scenario, many of the firms within the cartel
might choose to violate the agreed upon consensus, destroying the
benefits of collusion in the process. The temptation to cheat is
particularly strong if transactions by one firm cannot be observed
by its fellow colluders. The low visibility of transactions increases
each firm's belief that it can violate the cartel agreement without
being "caught" and "punished" by other members of the cartel.4 9
This potential for destruction from within constitutes the single
largest threat to the maintenance of collusive equilibria.5 0  The
ability of cartels to mitigate this force by using LPGs is one reason
why LPGs are particularly potent mechanisms for facilitating tacit
collusion.
III. TACIT COLLUSION
A. Facilitating Practices
As the OPEC example illustrates, 51 even overt legal cartels
have difficulty accomplishing the tasks needed for successful
collusion. The legal prohibition against collusion only complicates
matters.52 Many illegal cartels are formed through overt means,
that is, through formal written or oral agreements negotiated by
company officials in the proverbial "smoke-filled room."53 In
recent years, however, legal and economic scholars, antitrust
strategies. See ROBERT S. GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 7-8
(1991). In the case of a cartel, each of the firms within the cartel is a "player," and
the choice of a price or output level constitutes a "strategy." Each firm's "payoff" is
its profits. As is the case with most of the games studied by economists, each firm's
payoff is dependent upon both its own strategy and the strategies selected by the
other players.
49 See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 222-25 (discussing secret price cutting); Clark,
supra note 5, at 899 (noting the difficulty of detecting cheating if sales are made
through private negotiations); Hay, supra note 40, at 450-51 (contrasting open and
secret sales).
50 While the difficulty of forming a successful cartel should not be understated,
some successful cartels have lasted for years even in industries with a large number
of heterogeneous firms covering vast stretches of geography, differentiated products,
and widely varying costs. For a particularly vivid example, see the description of the
electrical equipment cartel in the 1950s provided by SCHERER, supra note 30, at 169-
71.
51 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
52 In fact, the normally simple task of establishing a cartel is often difficult to
accomplish through tacit means. Once a cartel is established, overcoming the other
obstacles required for successful collusion through tacit means is equally arduous.
53 See SCHERER,supra note 30, at 169-71 (noting the overt collusion that took place
in the electrical equipment industry in the 1950s).
1993] 2065
2066 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:2055
enforcement officials, and courts have recognized the possibility
that firms might conspire to fix prices without overtly communicat-
ing with each other. Under such "tacit collusion" schemes, any
information needed to accomplish the cartel's tasks is communicat-
ed through facially neutral means. In essence, firms utilize
seemingly benign public announcements, or changes in their pricing
policies, output levels, or other variables.
Truly competitive markets, however, provide a poor environ-
ment for tacit collusion. Competing firms tend to act myopically.
Each firm attempts to maximize its own revenue, yet fails to
consider that increasing output can decrease prices and profits for
the entire industry. In an effort to emphasize the interdependence
between the output by one firm and the profits of the entire
industry, firms often adopt one or more "facilitating practices."
These facially neutral practices allow firms in an otherwise competi-
tive industry to exchange information and restructure incentives so
that tacit collusion becomes more feasible.
54
1. Public Announcements and Interseller Verification
Most facilitating mechanisms appear harmless or even beneficial
to consumers at first glance. Upon closer inspection, however, their
collusive potential becomes clear. For example, firms might
announce price changes publicly with ample advance notice.
55
While customers might appreciate any warning of price changes,
this advance notice procedure can be used by a tacit cartel to build
a consensus concerning a collusive price target. The length of the
advance notice period might be designed to allow other members
of the conspiracy to suggest other alternative target prices.
56
Public announcements of other information, like cost or production
data, can play a similar consensus-building role. Alternatively, firms
54 See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW I 1435(a), at 222 (1988) (defining
"facilitating practices" as "steps [that] can increase the likelihood of anticompetitive
tacit coordination"); Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price With Your Victim: Efficiency and
Collusion with Competitor-Based Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599, 616
(1989) (defining "facilitating practices" as "[c]ertain practices [that] can move
oligopoly markets with barriers to entry closer to interdependence"); see also Salop,
supra note 5, at 271-73 (using game theory to examine various facilitating practices).
55 See Clark, supra note 5, at 919-26 (discussing the use of public announcements
as a facilitating practice).
' "Firms may make public announcements about pending price increases, often
well in advance of their effective date. This allows time for several rounds of
counterproposals in achieving a consensus." Hay, supra note 40, at 454.
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might allow inter-seller verification of price quotations. Under this
policy, sellers agree to furnish to any competitor who inquires the
price quoted to a particular customer. This strengthens the cartel
by eliminating lags in the detection of cheating.
57
2. Delivered Pricing
When firms are geographically dispersed and shipping costs
constitute a large share of the total cost to the customer, delivered
pricing policies can also facilitate tacit collusion. Under this policy,
sellers only quote prices that include the cost of transporting the
product to the buyer's place of business. This reduces the burden
of establishing a collusive consensus by eliminating uncertainty over
transportation costs.58 Without delivered pricing, cartel members
could cheat by disguising price cuts as reductions in shipping
charges.
3. Product Standardization
The facially neutral process of standardizing a product might
also facilitate tacit collusion. By decreasing the number of variables
that must be covered by any collusive agreement, product standard-
ization, although often beneficial to consumers, can often lead to
higher prices.59 "
Interdependent pricing formulas constitute the most sophisticat-
ed mechanism for facilitating tacit collusion. Under these policies,
the net price charged by one seller depends, in part, on the prices
it has previously demanded or the prices charged by its competitors.
57 See Simons, supra note 54, at 616-17; see also United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1969) (suggesting that the presence of an
interseller price verification scheme was evidence of collusion).
58 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1435(0, at 231-34; Clark, supra note 5, at 902;
Hay, supra note 40, at 454-55 (noting that without delivered price data, firms seeking
to establish a cartel would not know their rivals' delivery charges even if product
prices were posted, complicating efforts to collude); see also In re Ethyl Corp., 101
F.T.C. 425, vacated sub nom., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d
Cir. 1984) (discussing delivered pricing in the anti-knock gasoline additive industry).
See generally Dennis W. Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26J.L. &
EcON. 51 (1983) (describing the conditions under which delivered pricing can be used
to facilitate tacit collusion).
59 See Clark, supra note 5, at 902. For an example of product standardization
which the Federal Trade Commission prohibited to ensure competition, see In re
National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir.
1965) (prohibiting macaroni and spaghetti manufacturers from fixing the proportions
of ingredients used in their products).
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The most common interdependent pricing mechanisms are most-
favored-nation clauses ("MFNs") 60 and meeting-the-competition
clauses ("MCCs").
61
4. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Under an MFN, a seller guarantees that a buyer will be charged
a price no higher than the lowest price the seller charges any other
customer.62 A seller might extend MFNs to all of its customers or
just to a select few. These policies are usually inserted as clauses in
purchasing contracts, making them legally binding.63 The attrac-
tion such policies hold for buyers is obvious. Most-favored-nation
clauses guarantee to buyers that they will pay no more than their
rivals, and thereby ensure that they will not be at a cost disadvan-
tage in their industry.
There are two types of MFNs: contemporaneous and retroac-
tive.64 Under a contemporaneous MFN, a buyer is guaranteed a
price no greater than the price paid by any other customer for the
same product at the time of purchase. 65  A retroactive MFN, in
contrast, promises that the buyer will receive the benefit of any
price cuts that occur during a specified period of time after each
sale.66 The collusive implications of these two types of MFNs are
similar. Essentially, MFNs change the incentive structure of the
firms offering the policies. These firms are penalized for cutting
prices, since a price cut extended to one buyer also must be
extended to all other customers covered by the MFN. This can
significantly raise the costs of price cutting, particularly in the case
of retroactive MFNs. As a result, firms following these types of
pricing policies tend to avoid lowering their prices. When many
60 Most-favored-nation clauses are also known as most-favored-buyer clauses. See
6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1435(e), at 229; see also infra notes 62-69 and accompany-
ing text (discussing MFNs).
61 See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
62 See Salop, supra note 5, at 273; see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1435(e), at
229 (describing the policy as "price protection" or a "most-favored-buyer clause");
Clark, supra note 5, at 932-34 (noting the collusive implications of MFNs); Hay, supra
note 40, at 455-56 (noting potential benefits of MFNs to public utilities); Simons,
supra note 54, at 621-23 (considering the role of MFNs in long-term contracts).
63 See Salop, supra note 5, at 278.
r4 See id. at 273-78.
65 See id. at 275-78.
66 See id. at 274-75 (noting that the time period is usually between manufacture
and delivery of the product, thus protecting early buyers against later price
decreases).
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firms in an industry offer MFNs, price competition can decrease or
disappear.
67
Of the three tasks required of any cartel for successful collusion,
MFNs facilitate the third task-maintaining the collusive equilibrium.
If each firm in a silent conspiracy adopted MFNs with all of its
customers, the incentive to cheat by lowering prices from their
collusive equilibrium would be greatly reduced. Most-favored-nation
clauses do not, however, help to accomplish the second task needed
for successful cartelization-moving prices from competitive to
collusive levels. In fact, if firms introduce retroactive MFNs while
prices are at competitive levels, a failed attempt to raise prices to
supracompetitive levels becomes extremely expensive given the
penalty imposed by the MFNs.68  In industries where costs de-
crease with the passage of time,69 however, MFNs can fix prices
and prevent decreases in production costs from being passed on to
buyers.
67 See id. at 275-77 (providing an example of how MFNs can eliminate price
cutting). Note that firms may be reluctant to be the first in an industry to offer MFNs
since doing so places them at a competitive disadvantage by decreasing their ability
to match industry price cuts. See id. at 274. Economists have shown, however, that
under certain circumstances the adoption of such clauses by one firm can benefit all
of the firms in the industry, including the one offering the clause. This occurs
because the competitive disadvantage of not being able to match industry price cuts
is offset by the MFN's tendency to stabilize prices at a higher level. See id. (citingT.E.
Cooper, Price Protection Policies and Tacit Collusion (1981) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Florida)). See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-118 (1960) (providing a game-theoretic overview of pricing
mechanisms).
8 Note, however, that this result does not occur if firms adopt contemporaneous
MFNs.
69 Costs often fall with the passage of time in industries that benefit from
advances in technology, like the computer industry. Furthermore, the production
process for some goods is characterized by "learning curves," whereby costs are a
decreasing function of cumulative output. See ERNST R. BERNDT, THE PRACTICE OF
ECONOMETRICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 61, 66-71 (1991) (providing an
overview of learning curve literature); see also Kenneth A. Middleton, Wartime
Productivity Changes in the Airframe lndustty, 61 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 215, 221 (1945)
(discussing learning curves in the production of warplanes during World War II);
Allan D. Searle, Productivity Changes in Selected Wartime Shipbuilding Programs, 61
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1132 (1945) (presenting a similar study of how learning curves
reduced construction costs for Liberty ships). In a competitive market, cost cuts
caused by learning curve effects or advances in technology would be passed on to
consumers. Most-favored-nation clauses, however, might prevent this from occurring.
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5. Meeting-the-Competition Clauses
The second type of interdependent pricing policy, meeting- the-
competition clauses, do facilitate moving prices from competitive to
collusive levels. An MCC is an advertised or contractual provision
made by a seller promising to match any lower price offered by
another seller.70 Like MFNs, MCCs can be either contemporane-
ous or retroactive.
Salop further divides MCCs used in long-term contracts into
"release" and "no-release" categories. 71 Under a release MCC, a
seller may elect not to meet a lower price offered by a competitor,
but in exercising this option the seller must release the buyer from
the obligations of the long-term contract. 72 This allows the buyer
to receive the benefit of the lower price offered by the competitor.
Meeting-the-competition clauses with release provisions are often
used if the seller believes that the lower prices offered by competi-
tors are for inferior quality products; a seller who thinks that the
buyer would not actually purchase the lower cost substitute may
utilize the release clause to call the buyer's bluff.73 In contrast,
under no-release MCCs, the seller has no choice but to match any
lower prices offered by competitors.
74
Meeting-the-competition clauses, like MFNs, clearly extend
benefits to purchasers. By contracting for a no-release MCC, a
buyer can reap the benefits associated with long-term contracts
while guaranteeing that her contract pays the lowest prices.
Unfortunately, MCCs may also be used to facilitate tacit collusion.
In particular, a seller who provides MCCs to its customers might be
tempted to increase prices from competitive to collusive levels.
Meeting-the-competition clauses ensure that such a price-leader
would not lose any sales while waiting for rivals to match its price
increases, since buyers would be granted the lower prices offered by
rivals until they followed with their own price increases. In essence,
MCCs prevent the lost sales normally associated with leading a price
70 See Salop, supra note 5, at 280 (providing an example of contract language
offering a meetingthe-competition clause); see also International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947) (providing an example of an MCC, actually a
meet-or-release clause).
71 See Salop, supra note 5, at 279-81.
72 See id. at 280.
73 See id.
74 See id.
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increase. 75 Similarly, MCCs also eliminate the'incentives for rivals
to delay price increases because they do not gain any sales by
waiting.
76
While MFNs provide for the maintenance of collusive price
levels, MCCs provide a means of increasing prices to supracompeti-
tive levels. Meeting-the-competition clauses are not a particularly
effective mechanism for facilitating such price hikes, however, for
two reasons. First, the adoption of an MCC policy is largely
invisible to other firms. Unless the firm initiating MCCs publicizes
its adoption of the practice, its rivals might fail to follow its price
increases, mistakenly believing that their delay will win them
additional revenue. Therefore, the mere adoption of an MCC
policy might send a signal to other firms within the industry to form
a tacit cartel, although this signal is weak and might be missed by its
intended audience.
77
Second, though MCCs might be adopted by firms with collusive
intentions, if the planned silent conspiracy never emerges, the
industry might actually become more competitive. This results
because MCCs give buyers an additional incentive to monitor prices.
The buyers in turn will inform sellers of the prices being charged by
their competitors. This increase in information flow might actually
accelerate the movement of prices to competitive levels rather than
away from them.78 As a result, the would-be colluder could end
up forced to meet the competitive prices offered by its rivals for the
duration of its long-term contracts. Furthermore, even when MCCs
are used successfully to move prices above their competitive levels,
the resulting positive economic profits are short lived if the industry
lacks barriers to entry.
B. A Simple Example
While each of the practices above facilitates tacit collusion to
some degree when used independently, the real power of facilitating
mechanisms is revealed when the practices are used in concert. The
behavior of General Electric Co. ("GE") and Westinghouse Corp. in
75 See id. at 281.
76 See id. Note that this might not be true if new buyers enter the market
unencumbered by long-term contracts.
77 In contrast, note the strength of the collusive signal sent when one firm adopts
an LPG and then raises prices. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
78 See Clark, supra note 5, at 935 (describing this possibility in the context of meet-
or-release clauses).
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the turbogenerator industry from 1963 to 1973 provides a clear
example. 79 After a long investigation during the 1950s, the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department filed suit against
various manufacturers of electrical equipment for forming a cartel
in violation of the Sherman Act.8° This overt cartel had successful-
ly fixed prices on several products, including turbogenerators.
8 1
In 1962, these manufacturers, including GE and Westinghouse,
signed a consent decree in which they agreed to abstain from
collusive behavior in the future; the decree did not, however,
constitute an admission of guilt.
8 2
A decade later the Antitrust Division launched another price-
fixing investigation, although this one was restricted to the turbine
generator business, an industry dominated by two firms: Westing-
house and GE.83 The investigation determined that by using
facilitating mechanisms, particularly identical pricing policies with
an MFN, they had eliminated price competition in the industry.
8 4
After the overt electrical equipment cartel ended with the 1962
consent decree, the turbine generator industry was ripe for
collusion. First, there was a small number of firms-only two. As a
result, any information needed for collusion could easily be
exchanged through tacit methods that utilized even weak signals.
Second, the large fixed costs and massive economies of scale
associated with the production of turbogenerators provided a
powerful barrier to entry, so that GE and Westinghouse knew that
collusive profits could be sustained in the long term. The only
factor deterring collusion was the heterogeneous nature of the
79 This example is described in a modification to the consent decree that ended
thejustice Department's initial antitrust investigation of the turbogenerator industry.
The district court's conclusion that the modification was in the public interest is
reported at United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,659
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
81 See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 170-71.
82 See General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,716-17.
83 See id. at 72,716.
84 As the court confirming the consent decree wrote:
The government does not contend that the elimination of price competition
was the result of any direct covert communication between the parties, but
rather that it was the result of the conscious adoption and publication of
identical pricing policies in 1963-64 and the strict adherence to those
policies since that time.
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product; turbogenerators often must be custom-built to meet the
particular needs of each buyer.
8 5
In 1963, GE augmented the industry's natural proclivity toward
collusion by adopting several facilitating practices. First, the firm
constructed and publicly released a detailed price book. Rather
than listing the prices for completed generators, however, the price
book specified prices for components.8 6 The total cost of a
generator could be determined by adding the cost of each compo-
nent required by the particular buyer. Second, the company
announced all price changes publicly. Third, GE adopted a
retroactive MFN which provided that if GE lowered the price
charged to one buyer, any customer who had purchased within the
previous six months would be given an identical discount retroac-
tively.87  In short order, Westinghouse adopted each of these
facilitating practices, including publishing a price book identical to
GE's.
88
After some initial confusion caused by Westinghouse's failure to
interpret the pricing books correctly,8 9 the firms managed to
collude so successfully that they eliminated price competition. In
fact, the pricing books and public announcements of price changes
were so detailed that they enabled each manufacturer to predict the
exact price the other would bid in a particular situation and even
the precise type and size of turbogenerator.90 In effect, the wide
variety of turbogenerators demanded by customers meant that the
price books had to be detailed in order to facilitate tacit collusion.
The retroactive MFN served to deter price-cutting by imposing a
substantial penalty on any firm that lowered the price charged to
even a single customer. GE added legitimacy to the MFN by hiring
a public accounting firm to verify compliance with the price
protection upon the request of any customer.91 Casual observa-
85 See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 170 (noting that with turbine generators, "each
buyer demands modifications to suit its own special needs, and, as a result, two orders
are seldom exactly alike").
86 See General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,716.
87 See id.
88 See SCHERER, supra nte 30, at 182 (noting that GE, not Westinghouse, was the
price leader).
89 See id. at 182 (noting that when Westinghouse misinterpreted the price books
and undercut GE's price, GE viewed this as deliberate cheating and responded in
kind; within two months, however, both firms increased prices to the initial level
charged by GE).
:See General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,716.
91 SeeJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 85 (1988).
1993) 2073
2074 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:2055
tion suggests that the tacit cartel comprised of GE and Westing-
house was extremely successful. "In sharp contrast to the history of
the 1950s and early 1960s, GE and Westinghouse effected no
generator price decreases" during the 12 years after the adoption of
the facilitating practices in 1963.92 In fact during this period, the
firms managed to raise prices several times, usually with GE leading
any price increase and Westinghouse following within four days.
93
The tacit cartel ended when the Justice Department convinced GE
and Westinghouse to sign a consent decree designed to end the
price signalling. In particular, the decree prohibited the firms from:
publishing or utilizing price books, offering MFNs, and publicly
announcing price changes.
94
C. Offsetting Efficiencies
Although facilitating practices can be used for anticompetitive
purposes, as the GE-Westinghouse example illustrates, many of
these policies have legitimate, noncollusive uses as well. These
efficiency-enhancing effects must also be considered when evaluat-
ing these policies.
95
For example, public announcements of price and output
changes provide obvious benefits to customers who require advance
notice to plan their own production. Similarly, standardizing a
product can aid buyers by reducing supply uncertainties and
lowering inventory costs. In addition, both MFNs and MCCs
92 SCHERER, supra note 30, at 182.
93 See id.
94 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,660, at
72,718-20 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (modifying the consent decree and setting forth the
restrictions); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 61,661 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same).
95 Offsetting efficiencies must be considered for two reasons. First, a facilitating
practice should not be condemned ifits procompetitive influences exceed its collusive
potential. Second, to prove a violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff usually must
show that the defendants had an "agreement" and that the net effect of the
agreement was anticompetitive. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-89 (1978) (balancing the procompetitive and collusive
potential of allowing a professional organization to adopt industry-wide standards);
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
This balancing approach is called the "rule of reason." See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 68, at 187 (1977) (noting that under the rule
of reason approach "analysis is necessary to determine whether a particular practice
will restrain or aid competition, or if it has tendencies in both directions, what the net
effect is likely to be").
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provide several advantages to buyers, particularly in long-term
supply contracts.
First, the contracts can be used to allocate risk efficiently.
96
So, if the seller is better able to forecast price changes, the MFN
increases efficiency by ensuring that the seller shoulders any such
changes. Second, purchasers can use both MFNs and MCCs to
guarantee that they do not suffer a competitive disadvantage relative
to rivals buying the same input.97 These interdependent pricing
policies might also increase efficiency if the elimination of price
uncertainty convinces buyers to consummate purchases sooner than
they would without the price protection. Finally, interdependent
pricing policies might enhance efficiency by disseminating informa-
tion. Meeting-the-competition clauses might help sellers keep their
prices competitive with their rivals, for example, by speeding the
flow of price information. Similarly, in an environment with MCCs
and MFNs, buyers will always be able to calculate the actual market
price.
IV. LOW-PRICE GUARANTEES As FACILITATING MECHANISMS
A. The Mechanics of Using LPGs to Facilitate Collusion
In contrast to other facilitating practices, which are most
effective when used in concert, LPGs can facilitate tacit collusion
even when used independently. This section explains the mechanics
of using LPGs to facilitate tacit collusion. Specifically, the discus-
sion in this section describes the use of LPGs in a simplified,
theoretical environment in order to provide insight into how the
devices might work in the real world. Obviously, actual markets
might violate some of these assumptions, and the impact of these
violations is discussed below.
98
1. Simplifying Assumptions
To simplify the explanation of using LPGs to facilitate tacit
collusion, the target industry is assumed to have the following
characteristics. First, before the implementation of the LPG, the
industry is at a long-term competitive equilibrium and therefore is
96 See Clark, supra note 5, at 932-34 (noting that MFNs can accomplish risk-shifting
if the buyer is risk averse).97 Id. at 934-35.
98 See infra part IV.C.
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earning zero economic profits. Second, the industry features a
single homogeneous product. For purposes of this example, the
product will be a specified model of a portable stereo system.
Third, there are zero transaction costs.99 Fourth, consumers buy
from sellers offering the lowest net price. The combination of the
third and fourth assumptions implies that any time a buyer can
lower her costs by exercising an LPG, she will in fact do so. If, for
example, the industry has two firms, one offering a price of $100,
the other offering a price of $105 and providing a 110% LPG, the
customer will purchase from the second seller and activate the LPG,
paying a net price of $99.50.100 Finally, note that LPGs, like
MFNs, may be either contemporaneous or retroactive. While this
distinction does not significantly affect the logic which follows, for
simplicity assume that all LPGs are retroactive.
10 1
2. Initiating the Move to the Collusive Equilibrium
At the initial long-term competitive equilibrium, the homoge-
neous nature of the product ensures that there will be a single price
that clears the market. Therefore, all firms will be charging the
same price, say $100, for the portable stereo. Furthermore, since
the industry is earning zero economic profits there is no entry or
exit from the industry. 102 At this point, one firm, the price
leader, wishes to establish a tacit cartel to raise prices above
99 Transaction costs are defined to include "the costs of identifying the parties
with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of
the bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." See A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 12 (2d ed. 1989).
In the context of using LPGs, transaction costs might include the cost of locating the
retailer extending an LPG, the cost of finding a competitor's advertisement offering
a lower price, and the cost of exercising the guarantee.
100 To calculate the net price, first note that the difference between the prices of
the first and second sellers is $5. Since the seller offering the LPG promises to
refund 110% of this difference, or $5.50, a customer purchasing from this seller
would pay $105 - $5.50 = $99.50.
101 As with MFNs, the only difference is that a retroactive LPG is a more effective
mechanism for maintaining a collusive price level than a contemporaneous LPG
because the self-imposed penalty for price-cutting is greater with the former. Any
price cut must be passed on to the price-cutting firm's previous customers under a
retroactive LPG.
102 The sellers need not be identical. This has not been assumed, nor would it be
expected. As a result, the assumption of zero economic profits for the industry does
not imply that each firm is earning zero economic profits. In fact, some might earn
positive economic profits whereas others might have losses. Each firm's results would
depend upon its cost structure.
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competitive levels and increase industry profits.1 03  Rather than
adopting numerous facilitating practices and hoping that its rivals
follow suit, however, the price leader decides to raise its posted
price 5% and offer a 110% LPG.
10 4
Given the operation of the LPG, the net price charged by the
price leader falls to $99.50, which is $.50 cheaper than the $100
demanded by other sellers. This lower net price, coupled with the
assumption of zero transaction costs, entices all buyers to purchase
from the price leader. As a result, its market share instantly jumps
to 100%, while the market shares of all other firms fall to zero.
Despite this increase in market share, however, the price leader is
not necessarily better off. This is because its net revenue per sale
has fallen by $.50. As a result, unless its per-unit costs decrease with
increased sales, the price leader is worse off after raising its price
and offering the LPG.10 5 For the other firms in the industry the
situation is more drastic: the imposition of the LPG causes their
revenue to fall to zero. Therefore, these firms will all incur losses
because they must still pay their fixed costs.
10 6
This simple example illustrates the first strength of using LPGs
as a mechanism for facilitating tacit collusion: the signal sent by the
imposition of the LPG is extremely strong. The imposition of the
LPG by a single firm sends an immediate and very visible signal to
all of the other firms in the industry that one of their rivals seeks to
engage in collusive behavior. 10 7 The strength of the signals sent
by other interdependent pricing policies, in contrast, is much
103 Increasing prices will not increase industry profits unless the absolute value of
the price elasticity of demand is less than one. See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at
256 (discussing factors to be considered by barbers wishing to form a cartel to raise
profits from cutting hair). If the absolute value of the elasticity is greater than one,
the increase in per-unit revenue will be more than offset by a drop in the number of
units sold. The price elasticity of demand is defined as the ratio of the percentage
change in quantity demanded to the percentage change in price. Id. at 75; see also
infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between
elasticity of demand and the potential for cartelization).
104 For an example of the wording of such a guarantee, see supra note 1 and
accompanying text (quoting the Circuit City advertisement).
105 This does not, however, mean that the price leader incurs losses as a result of
the change in pricing policy. If the firm was earning positive profits before the
change, it could still earn positive profits afterward, although the level of profits
would fall. Obviously, if the firm was initially incurring losses orjust breaking even,
it would be generating greater losses after the adoption of the LPG.
106 Fixed costs are defined as costs that do not change with output. They are also
called overhead or unavoidable costs. See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 962.
107 Though every firm in the industry receives the signal sent by the price leader's
adoption of the LPG, some may misinterpret it.
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weaker. For example, if the price leader offered an MCC (with a
guarantee premium less than 100% of the price difference) instead
of an LPG, consumers would be indifferent between purchasing
from the price leader and any of its rivals. As a result, sales would
be divided between the price leader and the other firms. By
adopting an LPG which promises to refund more than 100% of the
price difference, in contrast, the price leader can siphon away all of
its competitors' sales.
3. Responses by Other Firms
Once the price leader has enacted the LPG, the other firms in
the industry must decide how to respond. They might lower their
prices in an attempt to regain their market share. Paradoxically,
however, following this strategy would only increase the incentive
for buyers to purchase from the price leader. By cutting their
prices, other firms effectively increase the difference between their
prices and those offered by the price leader. This in turn increases
the cost savings generated by activating the LPG. For example, if
the other firms cut the stereo's price from $100 to $95, the
difference between the prices charged by these firms and the price
leader increases to $10. As a result, the net price of purchasing
from the price leader and then exercising the LPG is $94.'08
Although any price cutting by firms other than the price leader
would only increase the price leader's market share, pursuing this
strategy could make sense. Price cuts increase the cost of offering
the LPG to the price leader, since the increase in price differences
raises the guarantee premium. Therefore, by cutting prices, the
other firms could raise the cost of offering the LPG, forcing the
price leader to incur unsustainable losses. This strategy would be
expensive, however, since the other firms would have to survive with
zero revenue (and net losses, given fixed costs) until the price leader
capitulated and rescinded the LPG. The strategy would be
particularly expensive in situations where the price leader was
actually profitable after offering the LPG.
Rather than cutting prices and waiting for the price leader to
return to his previous pricing policy, the other firms could respond
by mimicking the price leader. By increasing their prices and
108 To calculate this figure, first note than under the terms of the 110% LPG the
price leader's price falls by $11 (1.10 x 10). So the net price of purchasing from the
price leader and then activating the LPG would be $105 - $11 = $94.
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offering LPGs identical to that of the price leader, these firms could
regain their market share. Unless all firms increase their prices to
the level set by the price leader in concert, a firm that merely posts
a higher price but fails to offer an LPG would not gain any revenue.
This is because the net price to consumers of purchasing from this
firm would be higher than the prices charged by its rivals offering
the LPG.
Suppose, for example, that the aforementioned stereo could be
purchased from three retailers, the price leader and two "followers."
Suppose further that the price leader raises prices from the
competitive equilibrium level of $100 to $105 and then imposes the
LPG. If both followers immediately increase their prices to $105,
then the exercise value of the LPG drops to zero-it is only valuable
if there is a difference between the prices charged by the firm
offering the LPG and the followers. As a result, customers might be
indifferent among purchasing from any of the three firms, so the
two followers would once again receive revenue. Alternatively,
consumers might value the LPG, particularly if it were retroactive,
for the price protection it offers. Then the two followers would
have to both match the price leader's price and offer an identical
LPG in order to win revenue.
If the followers fail to arrive simultaneously at the supracompeti-
tive price posted by the price leader (arguably a more realistic
occurrence), then the first firm to reach the leader's price must also
replicate the leader's LPG in order to gain a positive market share.
To illustrate this, one need only modify the previous example so
that only one of the two followers matches the price leader's price.
Suppose, for example, that the price leader and the first follower
each post prices of $105, while the second follower leaves his price
at $100. In this situation, the net price of buying from the leader
and exercising the LPG is $99.50, while the net prices of buying
from the first and second followers are $105 and $100 respectively.
As a result, the price leader's market share would be left unchanged
at 100%. If, however, the first follower also offers an LPG once it
raises its price to $105, then consumers would be indifferent
between purchasing from it or the price leader. These two firms
would then share the market.
In essence, when one firm offers an LPG, the other firms in the
market often are forced to respond by offering matching LPGs to
win back market share. This effect helps maintain prices at
supracompetitive levels, particularly if the LPGs are retroactive, by
deterring price cutting. Furthermore, once additional firms have
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matched the price leader's LPG, the cartel can survive even if the
initial price leader leaves the industry.
109
4. Refining the Equilibrium
After LPGs have been used to facilitate an initial increase in
prices, nothing prevents firms from repeating the process to fine-
tune the collusive equilibrium. Therefore, if the initial collusive
equilibrium price was set too low to maximize the profits of each of
the firms in the cartel, the continuing presence of LPGs facilitates
a second round of price increases to accomplish this goal. If all of
the firms in the cartel had identical cost structures, then there
would be unanimous agreement about the ideal collusive price level.
If costs were constant, for example, and not a function of sales, then
the cartel would prefer to move prices to the level where the price
elasticity of demand is unity.
110
When the firms have different cost structures and costs are a
function of output, the problem faced by the cartel is more
complex. Each firm in the cartel might prefer a slightly different
price level. As a result, the collusive equilibrium might be unstable.
Even if such "bickering at the finish" of the movement toward
collusive prices does occur, however, every firm would still prefer
to keep prices above their competitive levels. In effect, any
bickering about the ideal price level is more likely to result in a
constantly shifting collusive equilibrium than in the complete
collapse of the cartel. The operation of LPGs, however, will
mitigate the instability of the collusive equilibrium. By depriving
firms that cut prices of all revenue, LPGs bias price instability in an
upward direction.
111
109 One would not expect the price leader or any other firm to leave the industry,
particularly once the collusive equilibrium has been achieved. If, however, the price
leader were a conglomerate, heavy losses in other sectors could force it into
bankruptcy and out of the collusive industry.
110 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 248 (noting that this level maximizes
industry revenue).
111 This would be particularly true if the LPGs were retroactive.
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5. Deterring Entry
After the tacit cartel has established a collusive equilibrium, the
concomitant positive economic profits will attract new entrants to
the industry. Fortunately for the cartel members, however, LPGs
operate to deter entry in three ways. First, naive entrants, those
who enter the industry merely offering lower prices in an effort to
undercut the cartel, will fail to generate any revenues. If the other
firms in the industry provide LPGs, then any new entrant posting a
lower price will have a higher net price thanks to the operation of
these pricing policies.
The second deterrent provided by LPGs can stymie even more
sophisticated entrants. Erudite entrants attracted to the industry by
the supracompetitive profits found at the collusive equilibrium
might realize that attempting to undercut the equilibrium price is
unwise, since this only increases the incentive to purchase from
firms offering the LPGs. Therefore, these sophisticated entrants
might enter the industry by offering an LPG and charging the same
price as the cartel. A firm that enters the industry in this manner,
however, can gain a share of the market only by wresting it away
from a member of the cartel. This is because the collusive equilibri-
um facilitated by LPGs fixes the price level.112 The aggregate
quantity demanded in the industry is then also fixed since the
industry demand schedule provides the unique quantity which
consumers will demand for a given price.1 13 As a result, any
market share gained by a new entrant must come at the expense of
existing firms. This result is unique to collusive equilibria estab-
lished via LPGs.114 Faced with the fact that any sales must come
at the expense of the better known cartel members, potential
entrants may be deterred. This is particularly true in industries
where the existing firms have established brand loyalty and name
112 To earn any revenue, the new entrant must set its price at the level provided
by the collusive equilibrium.
113 At any given price level, consumers will demand a specific quantity of the
product. The graphic representation of this relationship between price and quantity
is known as the demand curve. See LIPsEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 56-57. If there
are exogenous shocks to industry demand, then this unique quantity demanded could
vary over time.
114 With most collusive equilibria, economic profits attract new entrants whose
additional output forces prices lower.
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recognition.1 5  Any entrant would have to wage an expensive
advertising campaign to gain a foothold in the industry.
The third method in which collusive equilibria facilitated by
LPGs discourage new entry results from the fact that the adoption
of an LPG by one firm often inspires other firms to establish
identical pricing policies.1 1 6  As a result of this process, many
firms in the industry may offer LPGs. This increases the cost to a
potential entrant that hopes to break the cartel by offering very low
prices. Entering the industry with very low prices creates a huge
gap between the prices charged by the entrant and the cartel,
forcing cartel members offering LPGs to incur exorbitant guarantee
premium costs. If only one firm in the cartel offered an LPG, then
this entry strategy might be attractive, since a well capitalized
entrant could survive without revenue until the losses incurred by
the firm offering the LPG grew unsustainable. When multiple
members of the tacit cartel offer LPGs, however, the strategy loses
its luster. Outlasting one firm might be possible, but potential
entrants might be deterred if required to outlast most of the firms
in the industry.
As a result of these three entry deterrence mechanisms, the
supracompetitive profit levels facilitated by LPGs might survive even
in the long run. This is in sharp contrast to the fleeting profits
generated by less effective methods of implementing tacit collu-
sion.
117
B. Economic Evaluation
1. Economics Upside-Down
Compared to traditional economic theory, the incentive
structure induced by offering LPGs is best described as bizarre. In
a normal market, firms posting the lowest price tend to earn the
largest portion of sales, price cutting results in a greater market
share, and if the industry is earning positive economic profits,
115 Cf. SCHERER, supra note 30, at 380-93 (discussing the costs and benefits of
advertising and product differentiation).
116 See supra part IV.A.3.
117 These supracompetitive profits may, however, be extracted as rents by
companies supplying the collusive industry. These suppliers could demand higher
prices for the inputs used by members of the cartel. See infra part IV.C.2 (noting that
firms supplying the cartelized industry might be able to raise the prices they charge
retailers, extracting a share of the cartel's monopoly rents).
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additional firms enter the industry. In a market where LPGs are
present, however, each of these relationships is inverted. A firm
posting a higher price and offering the LPG earns all or most of the
revenue. Competitors posting lower prices see their market shares
disappear. Furthermore, price cutting by firms not offering the
LPG only provides buyers with additional incentive to purchase
from the market leader. In contrast to most markets, in industries
possessing LPGs firms must increase their posted prices in order to
regain market share. Finally, the firms that have cartelized an
industry through the use of LPGs can escape the dismal fate of
earning zero economic profits even in the long term.
2. Simplifying the Cartel's Tasks
The incentive system established by using LPGs, no matter how
strange, provides a fertile environment for tacit collusion. In fact,
compared to LPGs, other facilitating practices, whether used alone
or in concert, seem outmoded. The effectiveness of the LPG stems
from its ability to simplify each of the three tasks required for
successful collusion.
118
If other facilitating practices are used, then the cartel's first task,
establishing a consensus, requires the active participation of every
member of the cartel. In particular, each member of the cartel
must know that it is a member in order for coordinated action to
take place. When one or more firms wish to cartelize an industry
through tacit means, forming the cartel becomes especially difficult.
If a single firm adopts one or more of the facilitating practices
traditionally used to encourage tacit collusion, for example, its
action does not extend an obvious invitation to other firms in the
industry to follow suit and form a cartel.
One can hypothesize an industry at a competitive equilibrium in
which many firms share the market. If the industry contains only
a single homogenous product, then every firm must be charging the
same price in order to garner sales. Suppose that one firm wishes
to raise prices through tacit collusion. It might adopt an MCC,
begin announcing its price changes publicly, and institute delivered
pricing in order to ripen the market for tacit collusion. Unfortu-
nately for this would-be cartel leader, however, these actions might
go unnoticed by other firms in the industry. This is because such
actions might not impact the sales and profits of other firms.
119
11 These tasks are described supra note 40 and accompanying text.
119 Specifically, if buyers based purchase decisions only on price and valued
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In contrast, if the potential cartel leader utilized an LPG and raised
its price, the other firms would immediately see their revenue drop
drastically, an event that could never go unnoticed. While the other
firms might fail to interpret these changes as an invitation to engage
in tacit collusion, the potential cartel leader's acts would be heard
throughout the industry. In essence, the adoption of facilitating
mechanisms by one firm merely provides other firms with an
opportunity to collude. The institution of an LPG, in contrast,
coerces the other firms into playing their role in the collusive
equilibrium. Furthermore, once the cartel has been established, the
new higher price offered by the price leader provides an easily
recognizable target price for the cartel. 120 Under other forms of
tacit collusion, no one price level stands out as an obvious goal for
the cartel, which complicates efforts to establish a collusive
consensus.
By essentially coercing all of the firms in an industry to raise
their prices, the operation of LPGs greatly simplifies the cartel's
second task-moving prices to collusive levels. In fact, it is difficulr
to characterize the follower firms as members of a cartel since their
price increases could be the only rational responses to the adoption
of the LPG by the price leader. 121 In addition, once the collusive
equilibrium has been established, the cartel's third task-maintaining
prices at this higher level-is also facilitated by the LPG's ability to
deter price cutting and entry into the industry. In short, the three
obstacles to successful collusion which appeared so daunting before
now look much easier to overcome thanks to the imposition of
LPGs.
neither the MCC, public price announcements, nor delivered pricing, then the sales
of each firm would remain unchanged. No sales change would occur because these
facilitating practices leave the net price paid by the buyer unchanged.
120 In economic jargon, the price adopted by the price leader is a "focal point."
See SCHERER, supra note 30, at 190-93 (offering several examples of focal points). See
generally F.M. Scherer, Focal Point Pricing and Conscious Parallelism, 12 ANTrrRUST
BULL. 495, 497-502 (1967) (describing the technique of focal-point pricing).
121 This simple observation has legal ramifications. See infra notes 173-81 and
accompanying text.
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3. Absence of Additional Offsetting Efficiencies
While LPGs are extremely effective at facilitating tacit collusion,
they do offer some offsetting efficiencies. Specifically, they can be
used by buyers to ensure against being placed at a disadvantage
relative to their rivals. In addition, retroactive LPGs can be used by
risk-averse buyers to place the risk of price cuts on the sdller, who
might be better able to bear this risk.122 Finally, LPGs accelerate
the flow of information in the economy by giving buyers an
incentive to inform sellers that other firms are offering lower prices.
This list of offsetting efficiencies, however, is identical to the list
of benefits provided by traditional facilitating practices.123 In
essence, LPGs offer the same advantages associated with combining
MCCs and MFNs but also provide a much greater potential for
facilitating tacit collusion. This suggests that LPGs should be closely
regulated or even prohibited.
C. Using LPGs in the Real World
1. Violations of the Simplifying Assumptions
Although the above analysis suggests that LPGs have the
theoretical potential to cause great harm, the assumptions made to
derive the result do not stand in most markets. In particular, it is
useful to see how the analysis changes when the assumptions of a
homogeneous product and zero transaction costs are violated.
The assumption that the industry contained a single homoge-
neous product was instrumental to the effectiveness of using LPGs
to induce tacit collusion. If every firm in the industry sold a slightly
differentiated product, then the firm offering the LPG would have
to decide which competing goods the LPG should cover.124 This
complicates efforts to collude through tacit means, particularly if
production costs vary greatly across firms. If the LPG did not apply
122 For an interesting discussion on efficient risk-bearing, see COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 20, at 425-30 (noting that product warranties might be offered to
encourage efficient risk-bearing). See generally POLINSKY, supra note 99, at 53-58
(explaining the costs associated with bearing risk).
12 See supra part III.C.
124 In fact, new entrants seeking to undercut a cartel that uses LPGs could attempt
to develop close substitutes for the products covered by the LPGs. If the LPG did
not apply to these substitutes, then the new entrant could undermine the cartel by
pricing its product below the collusive level. In this sense, cartels forged via LPGs
provide a strong incentive for product differentiation.
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to all of the close substitutes for the price leader's product, then by
enacting the LPG and raising the price, the price leader would
merely lose market share, since the substitutes not covered by the
guarantee would have a lower net cost. Extending the LPG to
include lower cost substitutes, however, would increase the cost of
offering the LPG, since this raises the guarantee premium payments
rebated to buyers. This analysis might explain why the use of LPGs
seems most common in retailing, since retailers can, and often do,
limit the scope of their guarantees to competitors that are offering
a lower price on products of a specified brand and model num-
ber.
125
The assumption of zero transaction costs ensured that customers
would always exercise LPGs that reduced the net price of the
product. In reality, however, determining which competitors
offered lower prices could be costly, particularly in industries that
do not advertise. Furthermore, a customer wishing to activate a
retroactive LPG after making a purchase would have to incur the
expense of revisiting the retailer or regaining contact with the seller.
If these transaction costs exceeded the rebate provided by exercis-
ing the LPG, the guarantee would not be utilized. In reality, one
would expect transaction costs to differ greatly across the firms in
the industry. Therefore, exercising an LPG might make sense for
some buyers and not for others. The follower firms, those not
offering LPGs, might still attract revenue even if they continued to
post prices lower than the price leader's. Although the theoretical
evaluation of LPGs provided earlier indicated they send a deafening
signal to the follower firms (i.e., total deprivation of revenue), when
transaction costs are considered, the volume of the signal drops
markedly (to a partial loss of revenue). Note, however, that as long
as some buyers exercise the LPG, then other firms in the industry
should see their revenues and profits drop.
126
125 Restrictions of this type usually appear in the fine print of advertisements
extending LPGs. Small type below the LPG provided in the aforementioned Wiz
Home Entertainment Centers ad, for example, notes that the competitors' prices
covered by the LPG "must be for the identical model number." Wiz, supra note 2,
at A20.
126 Of course, even if none of the buyers in the industry exercises the LPG, the
mere adoption of an LPG by one firm might be viewed by other firms as a signal to
collude. Under this circumstance, however, the signal sent by instituting the LPG is
a passive one, which must be noticed as the result of affirmative acts by the receiver.
In essence, the signal sent by a completely unexercised LPG is identical to that sent
by adopting MCCs or MFNs. This is a much weaker signal than is sent by an
exercised LPG, since signals of this latter type have a blunt impact on the income
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Allowing for transaction costs does not substantially change the
argument presented earlier, however, since the price leader can
always act to minimize the impact of transaction costs. First, it
could minimize such costs directly. It might, for example, keep
detailed records of each sale, verify claims that competitors offer
lower prices via phone, and rebate retroactive guarantees by mail so
that buyers wishing to exercise the LPG need not revisit the retailer
offering the LPG. Second, and more importantly, the price leader
can tailor its actions to ensure that the benefit of exercising the
price guarantee exceeds the transaction costs faced by most
consumers. It can increase the exercise value of the LPG by either
increasing the percentage of the price difference refunded to
consumers or by raising its price to a higher level after instituting
the LPG.
Reconsider the example presented earlier,127 where the price
leader imposed a 110% LPG in a market where the competitive
equilibrium price was $100. The price leader then raised its price
$5 to $105. The net price to buyers purchasing from the price
leader and exercising the LPG was $99.50.128 Therefore, the
exercise value of the LPG was only $.50. For many consumers, the
transaction costs incurred exercising the LPG might exceed $.50.
The buyer might have to purchase a newspaper, for example, to
acquire an advertisement proving that a price leader's competitor
is charging a lower price. 129  As a result, relatively few buyers
would exercise the LPG, weakening its collusive signal. The price
leader can rectify this situation by increasing the percentage of price
differences refunded to consumers. In the current example, if the
price leader replaces his 110% LPG with a 150% LPG, the net price
of buying from the price leader and then exercising the LPG falls to
$97.50, increasing the exercise value of the LPG to $2.50.1"
statements of firms posting the lowest price.
127 See supra part IV.A.
128 See supra note 100.
129 In the retail context, the transaction costs associated with exercising the LPG
are actually very low, particularly for exercising a contemporaneous LPG. If the
buyer already subscribes to a newspaper, for example, then she must merely clip out
a competitor's advertisement evidencing a lower price and take it with her when she
makes her purchase. (The time and expense of traveling to the store cannot be
considered transaction costs of exercising the LPG, since these expenses would have
been incurred anyway.) Grocery shoppers frequently clip coupons which provide
savings of as little as $.25, so the transaction costs incurred by a consumer exercising
an LPG in the retail electronics context might be less than $.50.
130 The difference in prices charged by the price leader and other firms in the
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Therefore, every consumer who could exercise the LPG without
incurring transaction costs greater than $2.50 would find it in her
interest to do so. By increasing the rebate percentage, the firm
offering the LPG could entice more consumers to exercise it,
strengthening the collusive signal.
Alternatively, the price leader could increase the exercise value
of the LPG by increasing the difference between its price and the
prices charged by other firms. If the price leader institutes a 110%
LPG but then raises its price to $125, for example, then its net price
to buyers who exercise the LPG is only $97.50.131 Once again, all
buyers who could exercise the LPG without incurring more than
$2.50 in transaction costs would do so.
In many situations, however, the price leader might prefer to
overcome the effects of transaction costs by varying the rebate
percentage rather than its price. This is because the price leader
will often prefer to raise its price to the exact level that maximizes
its profits, so that this collusive price level becomes the cartel's
target. As was mentioned earlier, the price level selected by the
price leader could become a focal point for the cartel.1 3 2 A price
leader intending this result would therefore be constrained in
selecting its price level to overcome the influences of transaction
costs.
2. Industry Characteristics
Though the theoretical discussion of LPGs provided earlier did
not place any specific restrictions on industry characteristics (except
the product homogeneity requirement), LPGs are in fact more
effective in industries with certain features. The ideal industry for
cartelizing via LPGs would have the following characteristics:
inelastic demand, price flexibility, frequent sales transactions,
widespread use of advertising, existence of one or more well
capitalized firms, economies of scale, and the ability to prevent
vertical dissipation of profits.
industry remains at $5. The amount rebated to consumers, however, is now $7.50
(1.5 x $5). The net price of purchasing from the price leader and exercising the LPG
is then $105 - $7.50 = $97.50.
131 The price difference is $25 ($125 - $100). The exercise value of the LPG is
$27.50 (1.10 x $25). Therefore, the net price of buying from the price leader and
then exercising the LPG is $125 - $27.50 = $97.50.
132 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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If the demand for a good is inelastic, then increases in the price
of the good will result in relatively small changes in the quantity
demanded. 3 In fact, raising the price of a good with an inelastic
demand increases the total revenue of the industry supplying the
good. This occurs because the increase in per-unit revenue at the
higher price exceeds the loss of revenue resulting from the decrease
in the quantity demanded.lM If the demand for a good is elastic,
in contrast, increasing price decreases total revenue.1 3 5  As a
result, cartels, whether tacit or overt, are less likely to form in an
industry with elastic demand.
Price flexibility is also required for LPGs to be effective mecha-
nisms for implementing tacit collusion. In many manufacturing
industries where prices are fixed by long-term contracts, for
example, a potential price leader might be unable to raise its price
after instituting an LPG. In the retailing trades, in contrast, prices
can vary on a daily basis, so a seller could increase its price with
little difficulty. Similarly, a price leader in a retailing industry could
easily cancel its LPG if the rebates it granted customers became too
expensive. This might occur if the other firms in the industry
rejected the price leader's invitation to join a tacit cartel and instead
maintained their prices at competitive levels.
Frequent sales transactions also increase the effectiveness of
LPGs by expediting the revenue changes that signal the follower
firms to increase their prices. In industries where sales occur
infrequently, the price leader might have to wait a long time to
receive any supracompetitive profits from the cartel. As a result,
the discounted value of these profits might be insufficient to justify
the initial cost of instituting the LPG. In such cases, firms would be
unwilling to play the role of the price leader.
Advertising eases the collusive application of LPGs by providing
firms offering LPGs with accurate quotations of prices charged by
rival firms. In fact, many LPGs contain an express requirement that
buyers wishing to exercise the guarantee provide a printed advertise-
ment proving that a rival firm is offering a lower price.13 6 With-
13 The elasticity of demand is defined as the ratio of the percentage change in
quantity demanded to the percentage change in price. See LIPsEY ET AL., supra note
11, at 75. If the absolute value of this ratio is less than one, the demand for the good
is said to be inelastic. See id. at 76.
134 See id. at 77 (noting that if demand is inelastic, the price change dominates the
change in quantity demanded).
135 See id.
13 The Sixth Avenue Electronics and Wiz Home Entertainment Centers
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out this requirement, customers would have an enormous incentive
to lie about the prices charged by rival firms in order to maximize
the exercise value of the LPG and minimize their net costs.
13 7
Obviously, in this environment firms would be reluctant to offer
LPGs in the first place. When most firms in the industry advertise,
however, a price leader can extend an LPG with confidence that
claims made by customers about its competitors' prices can be
verified.
138
When a price leader first institutes an LPG and raises its price
above the level charged by its competitors, it must rebate cash to
customers who exercise the LPG. While this process ceases if and
when the other firms in the industry raise their price to the level
posted by the price leader, in the meantime it forces the price
leader to forego profits or perhaps even incur losses.139 Under
this latter circumstance, only well-capitalized firms could serve as
price leaders, since other firms might lack the capital base required
to sustain these initial losses. Therefore, industries that contain
well-capitalized firms capable of serving as price leaders provide a
more fertile environment for collusion via LPGs than other markets.
Similarly, potential price leaders might have greater incentive to
initiate LPGs in industries that feature economies of scale. This is
because the expense of paying the rebates required by the LPG
would be offset by the drop in per-unit costs realized as sales
volume increased. In effect, by gaining a large share of the market
by offering the lowest net price, the firm offering the LPG could
enjoy economies of scale which provide a serious competitive
advertisements mentioned previously both follow this practice. See supra note 2.
137 Actually, the requirement might not be absolutely necessary, since in many
retailing industries the firm offering the LPG could verify price claims by walking into
its rivals' stores and reading the price tags. However, in many retailing fields, such
as automobile retailing, this would not work since posted prices do not necessarily
reflect the prices at which transactions take place.
138 The fact that firms offering LPGs so willingly accept the validity of prices
provided in competitors' advertisements is surprising given that most advertisements
do not constitute legally binding offers to sell. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981). Note, however, that an LPG published as part of an
advertisement probably does constitute a legally binding offer to establish a unilateral
contract. This is because the LPG contains sufficient words of commitment, while
typical advertisements do not. See id.; ef. id. illus. 1 (stating that a detailed
advertisement containing words expressing the advertiser's commitment to sell
constitutes a legally binding offer). The exact legal status of LPGs, however, has
apparently never been litigated.
139 The exact outcome would depend on the cost structure of the price leader
relative to the rest of the industry.
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advantage. In this situation, the price leader would be more likely
to initiate the collusive process because the foregone profits or
losses incurred from doing so would be smaller than in an industry
without economies of scale.
140
The final industry characteristic that complements efforts to use
LPGs to facilitate tacit collusion is perhaps the least obvious. If
firms that successfully move prices from competitive to collusive
levels are denied the additional profits generated by this collusion,
then they will be reluctant to incur the initial costs and potential
legal liability associated with cartelization. Unfortunately for
potential cartel members, this seemingly contradictory outcome is
possible in many industries. Take, for example, the consumer
electronics retailing industry. Suppose that a silent cartel has
managed to use LPGs to push prices up to collusive levels and deter
new entry. The suppliers to the firms in the cartel will notice that
the demand for their products has dropped. Upon investigation,
these suppliers might notice the abnormal profits earned by cartel
members; the suppliers could then raise their own prices, appropri-
ating the supracompetitive profits earned by the cartel. In essence,
even if Circuit City, Wiz Home Entertainment Centers, and Silo
manage to cartelize the consumer electronics retailing industry,
Sony and Technics could end up enjoying the fruits of the cartel's
labor! As a result, in industries where this profit dissipation is
possible, firms might forego attempting to collude altogether,
whether through LPGs or other means.
141
Though the previous few paragraphs have described various
industry characteristics that increase the effectiveness of LPGs in
facilitating tacit collusion, one market characteristic was notably
absent-the number of firms. Much of the literature on facilitating
devices assumes that these practices can only be used for collusive
purposes in oligopolistic markets. 142  Admittedly, the actions
140 If the industry featured very large economies of scale, however, the price
leader would be better off trying to undercut its rivals' prices and establish a natural
monopoly.
141 Essentially, vertical profit dissipation is likely to result when there are no
substitutes for the products provided by specific suppliers. In such situations, the
suppliers can raise the prices charged to retailers, knowing that the retailers will
continue to demand roughly the same quantity of goods.
142 See Clark, supra note 5, at 893 (discussing oligopolistic coordination, but not
collusion by many firms); Hay, supra note 40 (considering only oligopolistic market
structures throughout his article); Salop, supra note 5, at 265 (titling his article
"Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination"); Simons, supra note 54,
at 635 (noting the effect of multiple facilitating practices in an oligopolistic market).
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needed to complete the tasks required of any successful cartel
become more difficult to coordinate as the number of firms in the
cartel grows. By simplifying each of these three tasks, however,
LPGs allow tacit collusion to take place even in normally competi-
tive markets with large numbers of firms. In fact, the previously
outlined process for using LPGs to facilitate tacit collusion requires
relatively little coordination. Instead, once one firm has decided to
act as the price leader, the other firms must merely respond
rationally. In this sense, each of the firms acts independently in
playing out its role in the collusive cartel. This feature complicates
efforts to prosecute cartels using LPGs, since parallel behavior by
firms within an industry would often not be considered to constitute
an "agreement" to restrain trade if the firms acted independently.
The Sherman Act's "agreement" requirement is discussed in detail
in the following section.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Overview of Laws Prohibiting Collusion
Collusion is prohibited under federal law by two statutes: the
Sherman Act 1 43 and the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act"). 1 44 These two antiquated statutes, however, were enacted
long before scholars and regulators understood the full potential of
tacit collusion. 14 5 As a result, efforts by courts to apply these laws
to cases involving tacit collusion "have been largely unsuccessful,
producing a confused series of opinions that provide little guidance
on when antitrust liability will be found."146 In response to this
uncertainty, legal scholars have produced a panoply of articles
detailing legal theories that discuss how tacit collusion falls within
the ambit of the Sherman or FTC Acts. 147  Lawmakers have
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
144 15 U.S.C. §§ 40-45 (1988).
145 The Sherman and FTC Acts were enacted in 1890 and 1914 respectively. See
Sherman Act, ch. 647, secs. 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); Federal Trade Commission Act,
ch. 311, secs. 1-11, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
146 Hay, supra note 40, at 465.
147 See, e.g., Mark D. Anderson, Vertical Agreements Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act: Results in Search of Reasons, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 905 (1985); Clark, supra note 5;
Michael Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REV. 797
(1954); Lee Goldman, Oligopoly Policy and the Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. REV. 73
(1986); Hay, supra note 40; Richard S. Markovits, Oligopolistic PricingSuits, the Sherman
Ac4 and Economic Welfare, Part IV The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of
OligopolisticPricing Suits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and
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proposed legislation to clarify prohibitions on collusion.1
48
Regulators have also introduced novel approaches to uncover and
prosecute tacit collusion.1 49 Despite these actions, the applicabili-
ty of the Sherman and FTC Acts to situations where firms collude
through facilitating practices is still unresolved.1 50
The current law provides three distinct tracks for prosecuting
tacit cartels. First, the cartel can be deemed a conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
151
Second, the cartel can be prosecuted for violating the anti-monopoly
provisions in section 2 of the Sherman Act.1 52 Finally, the facili-
tating practices used to establish the cartel may be enjoined if they
constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of section 5
of the FTC Act. 153 Unfortunately, reaching collusive outcomes
attained via LPGs would be difficult under any of these three
approaches. This is because the evidence of collusion provided by
LPGs is largely incongruent with that demanded by the three tracks.
In fact, this problem appears to vitiate any attempt to prosecute
collusive outcomes established by using LPGs under either section
of the Sherman Act. The FTC Act, in contrast, might offer hope,
particularly if the Federal Trade Commission adopts a clear
the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Simons, supra
note 54; Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
148 See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, REPORT OF THE WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POliCY app. (1969), reprinted in ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REV., Winter 1968-69, at 11, 64-70 (suggesting that oligopolistic industries
should be subdivided to prevent firms from gaining market share through collusive
means, whether tacit or overt); S. 1959, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), 121 CONG. REC.
19,221-24 (1975) (establishing a presumption of monopoly power if a corporation
earned an average return on net worth after taxes in excess of 15% for five
consecutive years, regardless of any evidence of covert or overt collusion); see also
SULLIVAN, supra note 95, §§ 128-29 (providing an overview of these proposed
statutes).
149 In 1978, for example, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
announced that it would consider lenient treatment for corporations and executives
who voluntarily report violations of antitrust laws to the Division. See MARSHALL C.
HOWARD, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION 69-70 (1983). When this approach
failed to bring the desired response, theJustice Department adopted a toll-free price-
fixin hotline, which it advertised on television. See id. at 70.
o See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436(a), at 238 (noting that attempts to
determine if the interdependent adoption of facilitating practices is within the reach
of the Sherman or FTC Acts "draw no certain answer from either principle or
precedent").
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
152 See id. § 2.
153 See id. § 45(a).
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standard identifying the situations in which LPGs will be prohibited.
The logic underlying these conclusions is described in the following
sections, which review the applicability of each of the three
approaches for prosecuting tacit collusion to situations involving
LPGs.
B. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
1. The Rule of Reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act serves as the primary mechanism
for combating price-fixing in the American economy. 5 4  The
wording of the section provides a very broad prohibition on
conspiracies and other practices that can raise prices to supra-
competitive levels: 155  "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 156 Undeterred by the seemingly boundless
scope of this prohibition, early court decisions applied section 1 of
the Sherman Act literally.157 Eventually, however, courts replaced
this extreme reading with a more measured interpretation. Under
this alternative approach, which governs the application of section 1
today, some contracts, combinations, and conspiracies are presumed
to be illegal, while others are prohibited only when they cause an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Actions which fall into the first
category are said to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.
1 58
Overt agreements between competitors fixing prices, for example,
constitute per se violations. 159 This is because such agreements
154 See 2 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRUsT LAW § 10.2 (1980) ("Price-fixing
is usually attacked under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and is the best known
antitrust violation.").
155 See id. § 9.1 (describing the section as "all-embracing").
156 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
157 See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904) (stating
that section 1 of the Sherman Act "does embrace and declare to be illegal every
contract, combination or conspiracy, in whateverform, of whatever nature, and whoever
may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in restraint of trade or
commerce" (emphasis added)).
158 See SULLVAN, supra note 95, §§ 67, 70, 72 (outlining the per se doctrine).
159 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,223 (1940) ("Under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se."); see also 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 10.2
(providing historical background on price-fixing).
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clearly evidence a specific intent to restrict trade and offer no
offsetting social benefit.160 In contrast, actions which have both
anticompetitive tendencies and potential offsetting benefits fall into
the latter category. Such actions are governed by the "rule of
reason." 161 Under this doctrine, these activities are only illegal if
they have a net anticompetitive effect.
162
Having defined the per se doctrine and the rule of reason, one
must ask which should apply to situations where prices have been
fixed through the use of facilitating practices, like LPGs. While
price-fixing is usually a per se violation, facilitation practices differ
from overt anticompetitive agreements by offering offsetting
benefits. These benefits should be balanced against their collusive
potential before being held illegal. 163 Accordingly, most scholars
argue that the rule of reason should apply to cases involving
facilitating practices. 164  Courts have generally heeded this ad-
vice.165
160 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (agreements
between competitors fixing prices are in "nature," "character," and "necessary effect"
adverse to competition and, therefore, subject to a "conclusive presumption" of
invalidity); see also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927)
("The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination
of one form of competition.").
161 See SULLIVAN, supra note 95, §§ 64-66 (explaining the development of the rule
of reason).
162 The rule of reason was first established by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil,
221 U.S. at 58-60 (noting that the Sherman Act reached all "undue restraint[s]" on
trade).
163 See supra part III.C (describing the benefits provided by various facilitating
practices).
, See Clark, supra note 5, at 917 (analyzing facilitating practices under the rule
of reason because the per se doctrine appears inappropriate); Simons, supra note 54,
at 626 n.148 (noting that courts should be expected to evaluate competitor-based
formula pricing clauses according to the rule of reason and not the per se doctrine
because the courts have not had significant exposure to such clauses and because "the
clauses provide efficiencies in many cases and should not automatically be presumed
to be anticompetitive"); see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1407(f), at 38 (noting that
certain facilitating practices, including price protection clauses, offer benefits to
buyers and therefore are "not totally without redeeming virtue"; as a result, "we are
not entitled to presume that the seller contracting on these terms must inevitably
have a 'specific intent' to control market prices through improper means").
165 See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 544
(1954) (holding that public statements circulated among rival film distributors are not
a per se violation of antitrust laws). In some situations, however, the courts have
applied the per se doctrine to cases involving facilitating practices. See United States
v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,337 (1969) (utilizing the per se doctrine
in a case involving interseller price verification). The Container Corp. case, however,
can be distinguished from other facilitating practices cases. In Container Corp. the
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Thus, courts hearing claims of tacit collusion facilitated through
the use of LPGs would be apt to apply the rule of reason. 166 In
order to prevail at trial, the plaintiff in such cases must show that
the anticompetitive impact of the LPGs exceeds their efficiency-
enhancing effects. In situations where LPGs actually have been
used to establish collusive outcomes, however, this should be readily
apparent, particularly given the ability of LPGs to sustain supra-
competitive profit levels for long periods of time.
167
2. Agreement Requirement
Other aspects of section 1, however, would hinder its application
to cartels using LPGs. Specifically, a plaintiff seeking to prove a
violation of this section must show that the members of the cartel
had an agreement to raise prices to supracompetitive levels.
1 68
This agreement requirement stems from the wording of sec-
tion 1.169 Recall that the section prohibits contracts, combina-
court found an agreement between manufacturers of corrugated containers "to
furnish price information whenever requested." Id. at 335. As a result, the majority
treated the case as an overt price-fixing case rather than one merely involving
facilitating practices. See id. at 337. Justice Fortas, concurring, took issue with the
application of the per se doctrine to interseller price verification, although his
application of the rule of reason also found the practices in violation of § 1. See id.
at 338-40 (Fortas, J., concurring).
166 See Simons, supra note 54, at 626 n.148 (suggesting that the rule of reason
applies to all types of competitor-based pricing schemes, a category that would
include LPGs); see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436(d) (noting that the sanctions
appropriate to price-fixing are inappropriate to situations involving facilitating
practices).
167 See supra part IV.B.1. Note that in situations where a price leader attempts to
use LPGs to prevent prices from continuing a natural downward trend, perhaps due
to learning curves or advances in technology, see supra note 69 and accompanying
text, but does not attempt to increase prices, the anticompetitive impact of the
policies will be difficult to assess. In these instances, however, reference can be made
to historical price patterns and measures of industry profit. See SCHERER, supra note
30, at 182 (comparing price changes after the adoption of facilitating practices with
those before in the context of the GE-Westinghouse turbogenerator investigation and
noting how the pattern of price movements changed after the introduction of
facilitating practices); cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 132
(2d Cir. 1984) (comparing the profits of accused cartel members with the average
return in the industry in the context of FTC Act litigation).
168 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 11 1409-15 (providing an exhaustive analysis of
the agreement requirement).
169 While the wording of the section provides the primary motivation for requiring
proof of an agreement to find a violation of§ 1, scholars have noted that there is also
a strong policy reason for this practice. Consider an oligopolistic industry in which
the firms have managed to raise prices to collusive levels without any agreement,
either tacit or overt, and without adopting any facilitating practices. This might occur
ECONOMICS UPSIDE-DOWN
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 170 By definition,
each of these items requires two or more actors. 171 Furthermore,
the legal meaning given to each of these terms demands that the
actors cooperate.
172
Given the illegality of collusion, cartel members have a strong
incentive to hide any evidence of an agreement. As a result, direct
evidence of collusion is seldom present, and proof of an agreement
must be inferred from indirect evidence. 173  Sometimes indirect
evidence strongly implies that an overt agreement to fix prices
existed. The plaintiff might show, for example, that the defendants
communicated with each other via phone or mail or that they
attended meetings together.174 If the agreement among the cartel
if the firms in the industry realize the interdependence of their actions and adjust
their output accordingly. See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432(b). Scholars say that
such outcomes arise through pure interdependence or pure oligopolistic coordina-
tion. See id.; Clark, supra note 5, at 893. Because these equilibria display the same
supracompetitive prices and underprovision of products associated with collusive
outcomes constructed through facilitating practices or overt collusion, they are just
as harmful to society. See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432(b). Unfortunately, they
are much more difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute. This is true for two reasons.
First, establishing a clear rule as to when liability for antitrust violations arises is
difficult. Second, even if a court could create a clear rule providing guidance to
firms, remedying violations would be extremely tough. "It has been argued that a
suitable injunction need only tell a defendant to stop 'agreeing' through tacit price
coordination.... In this context, however, that is equivalent to an injunction
compelling marginal-cost pricing." Id. I 1432(d)(5), at 203 (footnote omitted).
Courts, though, are not considered proper forums for continuously monitoring and
enforcing price controls in an industry. See id. These two criticisms do not, however,
apply to situations involving tacit collusion and facilitating practices. In these
situations, liability can be defined to accrue upon the adoption of the facilitating
practices. Furthermore, a simple injunction prohibiting the facilitating practices can
serve as a fair remedy. See id. I 1436(a).
170 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
171 See 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 9.7 (stating that "it is well-established that two
or more persons are necessary to form an actionable contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade"). Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, can
reach anticompetitive activities undertaken by a single actor. See id. § 9.2.
172 See id. § 9.3 (defining "contract" as "a binding agreement, express or implied";
.combination" as "the union or association of two or more persons to accomplish a
common purpose"; and "conspiracy" as "a partnership in crime").
173 See id. § 9.17.
174 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1430(a) (analyzing direct verbal communication
as evidence of overt collusion). Meetings between industry leaders have been held
to imply an illegal agreement. See Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
308 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 1962) (noting that the defendant's attendance at several
industry meetings was a factor to be considered in the antitrust analysis), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 907 (1963); Pittsburgh Plate Class Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400
(4th Cir. 1958) (discussing the effect that personal meetings between competitors at
an industry convention had on a subsequent price increase in that industry), affrd, 360
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members is tacit, however, then one must look to different kinds of
indirect evidence. Parallel conduct among firms in the same
industry, called "conscious parallelism," is often used as circumstan-
tial evidence of a tacit agreement. 175 The Supreme Court has
clearly stated, however, that conscious parallelism alone is not
sufficient to establish a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward
petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express. To be sure, business behavior is
admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may
infer agreement. But this Court has never held that proof of
parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or,
phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman
Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel
behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
1 76
Lower courts have also followed this view. 17 7 If the parallel
conduct is contrary to the economic self-interest of the firms
engaging in such conduct, however, courts afford greater weight to
the inference of an agreement. 178  Some courts require both
U.S. 395 (1959); see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1417(c)-(d) (discussing unex-
plained and secret meetings between competitors).
175 See 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 9.18 (describing conscious parallelism).
176 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41
(1954) (citations omitted).
177 See Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1027 n.27 (5th Cir.
1983); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d
457, 462 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Granddad Bread, Inc. v.
Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1076 (1981); see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1434(a), at 213 ("[T]he courts have
been very clear that mere parallelism, including interdependent conscious parallelism
cannot support a conspiracy finding unless there are additional or 'plus' factors.").
178 See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that
the failure of oil companies to market gasoline to their competitor's lessees is against
their independent self-interest and can only be explained by a mutual understanding
between the companies), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,
192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951) (noting that a distributor acting in contradiction of
its self-interest "strengthens considerably the inference of conspiracy"), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 929 (1952). Some courts will deny a defendant's motion for summary
judgment if the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant engaged in parallel
practices contrary to its independent economic self-interest. See e.g., Admiral Theatre
Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Only where the
pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with the self-interest of the individual
actors, were they acting alone, may an agreement be inferred solely from such parallel
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evidence of parallel conduct against self-interest and proof that the
defendant had a motivation to enter into the agreement.
179
The minimal judicial weight assigned to evidence of parallel
conduct which is not contrary to the firms' self-interest makes
prosecuting collusive cartels established through LPGs very difficult.
By rationally adopting LPGs that only incidentally construct a
collusive equilibrium,18 0 each firm in the tacit cartel could tell a
plausible story as to why the adoption of the LPG was in its own
economic self-interest. The price leader, for example, could merely
claim that it adopted the LPG and raised its posted price in an
effort to establish the lowest net price and increase market share.
The follower firms, in turn, could claim that they had to adopt LPGs
and raise their posted prices in order to regain market share and
revenue from the price leader. In essence, the actions of each
member of the cartel appear perfectly rational due to the operation
of the LPGs. As a result, efforts to infer an agreement from the
parallel adoption of LPGs and increases in prices associated with the
movement toward the collusive equilibrium would fail.
Some scholars have noted that in addition to or in the absence
of evidence that the parallel conduct was contrary to the economic
self-interest of market participants, the plaintiff in a section 1 action
may introduce other "plus factors" to imply the existence of an
agreement among the firms.' 8 ' In the context of tacit collusion,
facilitating practices may be considered plus factors. 8 2  This
assists in the prosecution of many tacit cartels, since they often
action." (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968)));
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 84-85
(9th Cir. 1969) (agreeing with the plaintiff that there was enough other evidence in
the case to sustain a finding of conspiracy), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
179 See e.g., Schoenkopfv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208
(3d Cir. 1980) ("To establish consciously parallel behavior, a plaintiff must show (1)
that the defendants' business behavior was parallel, and (2) that the defendants were
conscious of each other's conduct and that their awareness was an element in their
decisional process."); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d
1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[The] elements generally considered critical in
establishing conspiracy from evidence of parallel business behavior [are]: (1) a
showing of acts by defendants in contradiction of their own economic interests, and
(2) satisfactory demonstration of a motivation to enter an agreement." (citations
omitted)).
180 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
181 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, [ 1433-34 (describing how courts evaluate cases
with and without "plus factors").
182 See id. 1434(e), at 221 (noting that facilitating practices "certainly bear on the
economic consequences of oligopoly and can affect the proper legal treatment of it").
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utilize a variety of facilitating practices in combination.1 8 3 The
use of LPGs alone, however, offers greater collusive power than
several other facilitating practices combined.1 84 As a result, any
cartel wishing to collude by using LPGs would not need to adopt
any other facilitating practices.
Furthermore, while there are some "plus factors" that are
distinct from facilitating practices, most of these apply in only
limited situations. One scholar, for example, lists several "plus
factors" including: evidence of "correspondence, meetings, or other
communications providing the alleged conspirators with an
opportunity to agree; failure to offer justifications for the parallel
conduct; prior illegal conduct; or uniformity that would be
extremely improbable absent agreement."18 5 Obviously, in a tacit
collusion case, evidence of correspondence, meetings, or other
communication will not exist. As was explained above, in cases
involving LPGs, every firm in the cartel can provide a justification
for the parallel actions in the industry. In addition, prior illegal
conduct is probably seldom present, so its value as a plus factor is
very limited. The last plus factor listed above, unexplained
uniformity, also does not aid in the prosecution of cartels using
LPGs. This is because LPGs are most likely to be used in industries
where the product is very homogeneous by nature.1 86 For exam-
ple, in any type of retailing environment in which the seller does
not manufacture the goods, all firms in the industry will offer
identical products. Put another way, a specific model of Sony
Walkman is the same product whether it is purchased from Silo or
Circuit City.
3. Proposals for Reform
As the paragraphs above make clear, the agreement requirement
demanded by section 1 of the Sherman Act complicates efforts to
use this piece of legislation to prosecute tacit collusion. This effect
is heightened in cases involving LPGs, a fact that the "plus factor"
183 See supra part III.B (describing collusion by GE and Westinghouse in the
turbogenerator industry). In the turbogenerator example, GE and Westinghouse both
used several facilitating practices in concert, including the adoption of MFNs, the
publication of price books, and advance notice of price changes. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-88.
184 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
185 Goldman, supra note 147, at 79-80 (footnotes omitted).
6 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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analysis fails to mitigate. In response to section l's weaknesses,
many scholars have proposed new legal theories that would increase
the section's ability to prevent tacit collusion. While none of these
proposals offers a workable solution to the problem of using sec-
tion 1 to prosecute tacit collusion sustained by LPGs, two are
worthy of comment.
a. Posner
Of the two proposed legal theories for strengthening section 1
considered here, Judge Richard Posner's is the more radical.
Posner suggests extending the legal definition of "agreement" to
include any type of interdependent decisionmaking in oligopolistic
markets.18 7 In essence, Posner argues that interdependent deci-
sion-making constitutes an "agreement to agree." 18 8 He apparent-
ly has a broad view of interdependent decisionmaking, as revealed
by the following example:
It must be emphasized that tacit collusion is not an unconscious
state. If the firm's sales manager recommends that the firm offer
a wider variety of products in order to exploit consumer demand
more effectively, and the financial vice-president recommends
against that course on the ground that it will make it more
difficult for the industry to maintain "healthy" prices, the presi-
dent can be in no doubt of the significance of his actions if he
adopts the financial vice-president's recommendation.1
8 9
This passage suggests that Posner believes that competing firms
form an "agreement" every time the executives of one firm consider
the impact of their actions on the broader industry, rather than
merely on their own firm. Under this analysis all competitor-based
pricing policies, including LPGs, would constitute agreements for
187 See Posner, supra note 147, at 1575-78. Note that other scholars have also
proposed extending the definition of agreement to reach various types of interde-
pendent decisionmaking. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 147, at 815-17 ("[T]he scope
of the Sherman Act, condemning combinations by trust or otherwise, should be broad
enough to encompass collusion restraints resulting merely from the adjustments of
the firms in a market to each others policies."); Markovits, supra note 147, at 57-58
(stating that it would be desirable for the government to educate the public on the
equivalence of implicitly and explicitly communicated anticompetitive threats).
Finally, at least one scholar proposes redefining agreement to include pure
oligopolistic interdependence, but argues that the agreement should not be deemed
illegal. See Turner, supra note 147, at 663-72.
188 Posner, supra note 147, at 1576-78.
189 RICHAID A. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 74-75
(1976).
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section 1 purposes, since the net price charged by any firm
honoring such a policy depends on the prices charged by its rivals.
As a result, Posner's reform would overcome the difficulties
associated with finding an agreement in situations where LPGs have
been used for collusive purposes.
Posner's proposal has been widely criticized by other schol-
ars, 190 notwithstanding the suggestion by some courts that the
definition of agreement could be extended to include interdepen-
dent decisionmaking. 19 1  Essentially, these critics offer three
objections to Posner's proposition. First, identifying instances
where prices were above competitive levels due to interdependent
decisionmaking would be extremely difficult. Since by definition
these instances lack facilitating practices, which can often be used
to identify cartelized industries, Posner's proposal would require
antitrust enforcement officials to compare prices with each firm's
marginal costs. 192  While theoretically sound, this approach is
virtually impossible to apply. In fact, in, other areas of antitrust law,
many courts have already given up trying to calculate marginal costs
and instead use estimates of average variable costs.
193
190 See, e.g., 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432 (arguing that antitrust laws should
not be extended to prohibit pure oligopolistic interdependence); Goldman, supra note
147, at 83-90 (suggesting that Posner underestimates the difficulty of applying his
approach); Simons, supra note 54, at 629-30 (criticizing Posner).
191 See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1977)
(stating that the theory should be tested on a more fully developed factual record),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Modern Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Such parallel conduct is consistent
with independent competitive decisions or at most reflects a non-consensual decision
not to compete."); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 541 F.Supp.
1147, 1155 (D.S.D. 1982) ("Plaintiffs must be able to show, through additional facts,
that the conscious parallel actions... were concerted and interdependent."), aff'd,
714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984). Goldman lists these
cases as potential support for Posner's proposition, but then notes that they involve
interdependent conduct influencing nonprice items. This is significant, since courts
can easily enjoin this type of behavior but cannot readily enforce price controls. See
Goldman, supra note 147, at 83 & n.35; see also supra note 169 and infra notes 194-95
and accompanying text (discussing the policy arguments against extending the
application of antitrust laws to situations involving pure oligopolistic interdepen-
dence). Furthermore, Sullivan notes that applying antitrust laws to interdependent
pricing is consistent with the congressional distaste for supracompetitive prices which
motivated Congress to pass § 1. See SULLIVAN, supra note 95, § 122.
192 See Goldman, supra note 147, at 84 (noting the difficulties associated with
estimating marginal costs).
193 See id. at 85. Goldman lists several cases that have used average variable costs
as a surrogate for marginal costs: MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Transamerica
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The second criticism of Posner's approach is that, even if
industries with interdependent pricing could be identified, courts
cannot structure an effective remedy absent the presence of
facilitating practices.194 A court's only apparent remedy would be
to decree prices. Once prices are judicially established, the court
would have to monitor compliance and consider possible changes
in the stipulated prices to reflect changes in the producer's costs.
As Professor Areeda wisely notes, however, "[t]he antitrust courts
have long seen themselves as unsuited for the task-indeed for the
continuous task-of general price control in one industry and
certainly not for the many oligopolistic markets in our econo-
my."195  In cases involving facilitating practices, however, the
courts can structure an effective remedy by enjoining the activities
that facilitate collusion.
196
The final criticism of Posner's proposal is that it requires an
excessively liberal interpretation of the word "agreement."
Decisions based partially on the anticipated responses of others
hardly fall within the common-usage definition of agreement.
Posner's broad interpretation of the agreement requirement is
contrary to the well-established maxim that a contract, combination,
or conspiracy in violation of section 1 requires two or more
actors. 197 Even Professor Areeda, who subscribes to a very flexi-
ble interpretation of the Sherman Act,198 refuses to consider
mere interdependence a conspiracy in violation of section 1.199
Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1385 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
955 (1983); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 824 (6th
Cir. 1982); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.,
517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See Goldman,
supra note 147, at 85 n.44.
194 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432(d)(5); see also supra note 169.
195 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432(d)(5), at 203.
196 See id.
197 See 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 9.7.
198 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54,1 1432(c)(1), at 196 (stating that "[t]he 'meaning'
of a statute is not necessarily determined by what was specifically known or
contemplated by the enacting legislators" and suggesting that the Sherman Act was
"essentially a grant ofjurisdiction to federal courts to create and develop a 'common
law of antitrust'").
199 See id. I 1432(c)(1). As Areeda notes, "arguments in favor of a 'living' and
'growing' Sherman Act can be pressed too far. At the very least, possible extensions
must be consistent with antitrust policy, consistent with the internal structure of
antitrust doctrines and applications, and consistent with more general principles of
our legal systems." Id. at 197.
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At first glance, Posner's proposal to extend the definition of
agreement to include interdependent decisionmaking seems to offer
a quick fix for the Sherman Act's inability to reach tacit collusion
cases, including those facilitated by LPGs. Upon closer analysis,
however, the proposal's flaws become apparent. These flaws,
particularly the inability to identify interdependent markets and to
proffer an acceptable remedy, might explain why courts have not
adopted his suggestions.
b. Simons
A second proposal for reaching tacit collusion under section 1
of the Sherman Act is advanced by Joseph Simons. Relative to
Posner's suggestions, Simons's proposal is both less radical and less
troublesome. Moreover, if adopted, Simons's approach could
actually extend section 1 so that it offers limited protection against
cartels established using LPGs.
Specifically, Simons notes that while section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits "contracts" in restraint of trade, nothing in the act
limits this term to the horizontal contracts between competitors in
an industry.20 0 Most analyses of the agreement requirement in
section 1 focus on finding such a horizontal agreement between
competitors. 2° 1  When firms adopt competitor-based pricing
clauses, however, they create vertical agreements between buyers
and sellers.20 2 Consider, for example, an MFN embedded within
a long-term supply contract. In this situation the clause would
constitute a legally binding agreement; the seller would be required
to charge the buyer whose contract has such a clause a price no
greater than that charged to any other customer.20 3 The adoption
of MFNs by many firms in an industry may engender collusive
results. 20 4 If collusion does in fact lift prices to supracompetitive
levels, Simons argues that section 1 of the Sherman Act applies.
Under Simons's analysis, section 1 liability is predicated on the
agreement between the buyer and seller contained in the MFN, not
200 See Simons, supra note 54, at 630; id. at 631 n.183 ("I am aware of no policy
basis for limiting agreements for Sherman Act purposes only to horizontal
relationships.").
201 See supra part V.B.2.
202 See Simons, supra note 54, at 630-31.
203 Most-favored-nation clauses were defined and described supra notes 62-69 and
accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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on some elusive, ephemeral agreement between competitors to
conspire.
2 °5
Simons's proposal has several strengths. First, it is elegant. In
contrast to Posner, who attempts to expand the reach of section 1
by grabbing an ax and chopping away at the legal oak formed by the
existing agreement requirement, Simons uses a scalpel to perform
cosmetic surgery on the demand for an agreement. In fact, Simons
would argue that his proposal is not even this invasive, for its
second strength is its congruence with case law. In particular,
Simons cites two United States Supreme Court cases as support for
his proposition that section 1 liability can accrue from vertical
agreements. In the first case, FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Service Co.,206 the Court found that certain horizontal contractual
provisions violated the antitrust laws. Specifically, the Court noted
that the defendant movie distributor's contracts with theaters ran
for up to five years and often prohibited the theaters from showing
advertising films from other distributors. 20 7  These exclusive
contracts were industry-wide, compelling the Court to find that they
had restrained trade in a manner that fell within the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act.20 8 The actual decision, however, found a
violation of the FTC Act, the statute under which the matter was
litigated. 20 9 The Court, however, expressly applied the require-
ments of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
210
The second of the two cases relied upon by Simons involves
section 3 of the Clayton Act,2 11 but he claims that the principle
involved is equally applicable to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
212
In this second case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States,213 the defen-
dant oil company maintained exclusive dealing contracts with
independent service stations prohibiting these stations from selling
205 See Simons, supra note 54, at 630-31.
206 344 U.S. 392 (1953); see Simons, supra note 54, at 632.
207 See 344 U.S. at 393.
208 See id. at 395.
209 See id.
210 See id. Note that the FTC Act may be used to enforce the prohibitions
contained in the antitrust laws, including section 1 of the Sherman Act. See E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1984). For a more
detailed description of the relationship between the Sherman and FTC Acts, see infra
notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
211 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
212 See Simons, supra note 54, at 633.
213 337 U.S. 293 (1949); see Simons, supra note 54, at 632-33.
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gasoline supplied by any company other than the defendant.
2 14
Other oil companies adopted similar agreements; as a result, more
than 98% of all gas stations were tied to a specific oil company.
2 15
Once again the Court found a violation of antitrust laws on the basis
of the vertical relationship between seller and buyer.
The third advantage to Simons's proposal is that by focusing on
vertical agreements, industry structure becomes irrelevant. Most
analyses of the section 1 agreement requirement evaluate the
possibility of construing facilitating practices within an oligopolistic
market as evidence of conspiracy. 216 The Simons analysis, howev-
er, is equally applicable to oligopolistic or competitive markets.
2 17
This is important, since LPGs can theoretically facilitate collusive
outcomes even in markets that are normally competitive. 218  A
legal theory predicated on market power would be inapplicable to
such situations.
The Simons analysis could reach collusive outcomes facilitated
by LPGs by holding that the guarantees themselves constitute
agreements. There are, however, several flaws with this analysis.
First, in contrast to the MFN example, 219 LPGs are usually not
embedded within long-term contracts. Instead, they frequently
appear in advertisements. 220  In these situations, LPGs do not
constitute legally binding contracts; instead, they are offers to create
a unilateral contract. 22 1 Of course, once a customer fulfills the
terms of the offer, perhaps by bringing in a competitor's advertise-
214 See 337 U.S. at 295-96.
215 See id. at 295.
216 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 11 1428-36.
217 See Simons, supra note 54, at 630-31.
218 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 138 (noting that LPGs embedded in advertisements are probably
legally binding offers). Although in most instances "there will be an agreement for
antitrust purposes even though the challenged arrangement falls short of forming a
contract," 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1404, at 19, it is not clear that this weak
standard should apply in cases where antitrust liability is premised on vertical
contracts. In fact, each of the two cases cited by Simons in support of his proposition
(that the Sherman Act's agreement requirement can be met by vertical agreements)
contained formal, legally binding contracts. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393 (1953) (describing the contracts between producers of
advertising films and theater owners); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
295-96 (1949) (describing the exclusive supply contracts between Standard Oil Co.
and independent gasoline retailers). For this reason, this Comment assumes that in
the vertical context, only formal, legally binding contracts can satisfy the Sherman
Act's agreement requirement.
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ment evidencing a lower price, a contract is created and the
guarantor is obligated to honor the terms of the LPG. As a result,
the Simons analysis applies to situations involving LPGs, but only if
the LPGs are actually utilized by consumers. Recall the theoretical
description of the mechanics for using LPGs to facilitate tacit
collusion provided earlier.222 This account noted that when the
price leader first introduces an LPG and raises its posted price, all
consumers would invoke the guarantee in an effort to lower their
net price. 223 Even when transaction costs were considered, most
consumers would still be expected to utilize the guarantee.
224
Once other firms in the industry respond, however, by raising their
posted price and perhaps enacting LPGs of their own, the exercise
value of the LPGs falls to zero. 225 At this point, the collusive
equilibrium is established and customers no longer exercise the
LPGs.
In light of this description, the Simons proposal offers only a
partial solution to the difficulty of prosecuting collusion facilitated
via LPGs. During the initial movement away from the competitive
price, consumers exercise the LPGs. This provides the vertical
agreement upon which Simons bases section 1 liability. After the
collusive equilibrium has been established, however, the LPGs are
no longer enforced in the market. As a result, they merely
constitute offers, not contracts or agreements. Therefore, the
Simons proposal cannot apply once the collusive outcome has been
reached via LPGs.
226
The Simons proposal seems to suffer from one additional flaw.
By relying on the Sherman Act, violations of which can be consid-
ered felonies and/or carry liability for treble damages, the Simons
proposal might create over-deterrence. 227 In effect, some sellers
might forgo offering competitor-based pricing clauses when doing
so would be efficiency-enhancing in order to avoid the possibility of
paying exorbitant damages and fines or facing criminal liability.
222 See supra part W.A.
223 See supra part IV.A.1.
224 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
225 See supra part IV.A.3.
226 Of course, if the firms in the silent cartel could not agree on the proper
collusive equilibrium price due to the "bickering at the top" phenomenon described
earlier, the LPGs might retain some exercise value. See supra text accompanying note
111. On the other hand, this could be less than the transaction costs of utilizing the
guarantee, so the LPGs might remain unused.
227 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1432(e) (noting the danger of over-deterrence
created by the treble damages and criminal sanction provisions of the Sherman Act).
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The Simons proposal suggests applying the rule of reason to ensure
that only policies that are, on balance, anticompetitive are prosecut-
ed successfully. 228 Yet Simons fails to consider that the strong
punishment inflicted upon section 1 violators might combine with
uncertainty to deter sellers from offering desirable price protection
clauses.
4. Summary of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
As was discussed earlier, section 1 of the Sherman Act seems
unable to prevent effectively collusive outcomes established by
LPGs. 2 29 This result is largely due to the section's agreement
requirement, which is difficult to meet in situations involving tacit
collusion generally and LPGs specifically. Furthermore, the legal
theories proposed by Judge Posner and Mr. Simons, neither of
which has been accepted by the courts, would not completely
mitigate the difficulties associated with prosecuting firms offering
LPGs. Therefore, one must look to other legislative provisions to
find an effective weapon against the collusive results that may be
brought about by LPGs.
C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
1. Statutory Language
Given the weaknesses of applying section 1, several commenta-
tors have suggested that section 2 of the Sherman Act be used to
prohibit tacit collusion. Unfortunately, the application of this
section to cases involving tacit collusion is extremely limited; in fact,
the section seems completely inappropriate to situations involving
collusion through LPGs.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
228 See Simons, supra note 54, at 631.
29 See supra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
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three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
23 0
In contrast to the singular, broad prohibition against restraint of
trade established by section 1, section 2 of the Sherman Act
delineates three separate offenses: monopolizing, attempting to
monopolize, and conspiring to monopolize. 23 1  Despite this
difference, the two sections are related and overlap to some extent.
For example, monopolizing in violation of section 2 may also be
considered an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section
1.232 The two sections differ in that while at least two actors are
required to violate section 1, a single firm or person may violate the
antimonopoly provisions of section 2.233
2. The Three Offenses
Two of the three offenses delineated in section 2 are of little
consequence to situations involving LPGs. The first provision in
section 2, for example, bluntly prohibits monopolizing. This offense
does not apply to tacit cartels established through LPGs, however,
since "[m]onopolization refers to market dominance by a single
firm, and does not apply to market dominance by a group of
firms." 23 4  The third provision in section 2, which prohibits
conspiracies to monopolize, does theoretically apply to cartels, but
seems redundant given that any violation of this offense must
necessarily constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade contrary to
section 1 of the Sherman Act.23 5  In fact, few courts have ad-
dressed this duplicity, largely because section 2 conspiracy allega-
tions are "an afterthought appended to § 1 claims."23 6 Two cases
that have tested the bounds of the prohibition against conspiracy to
monopolize, however, have both concluded that establishing a
violation of this provision requires the same proof needed to
establish an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1.237
230 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
231 See 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 11.1.
232 See id. § 11.5.
233 See id.
234 Id. § 12.1. But see 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 36, ch. 8E (evaluating the
possibility of'prosecuting shared monopoly under the prohibition against monopoliz-
ing contained in § 2).
235 See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 36, 1 839 (concluding that there is no
need to define the content of the § 2 conspiracy given its redundancy).
236 id.
237 See Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
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As a result, plaintiffs seeking to establish a violation of this third
provision of section 2 must fulfill the agreement requirement
associated with section 1-the very requirement that would vitiate
any attempt to prosecute collusive outcomes established through
LPGs.
238
The second offense delineated in section 2, attempt to monopo-
lize, might apply to situations involving LPGs. Specifically,
Professor Areeda has constructed what he admits is a "complex and
debatable" argument for applying this offense to cases involving
tacit collusion.2 39 Areeda posits a firm that expressly solicits its
rivals to engage in price-fixing. If the offer is accepted, then a
conspiracy is formed and the acts can be prosecuted under either
section 1 or the conspiracy provision in section 2. Areeda claims,
however, that if the solicitation is rejected the solicitor can be
charged with attempt to monopolize even if she lacked the monopo-
ly power usually demanded for prosecution under section 2.240
The monopoly power requirement could be met by arguing that a
successful solicitation would have resulted in monopoly power.
2 4
1
The very act of soliciting partners for a price-fixing conspiracy could
be deemed illustrative of specific intent to monopolize. 24 2 Fur-
thermore, if the solicitation is made in a collusive environment,
there might be a dangerous probability that the intended monopoly
will occur. In sum, each of the three "doctrinal prerequisites of
attempted monopolization are satisfied: a specific intent to attain
monopoly power, ... improper conduct[,] and the dangerous
probability [of success]."24 3
At first glance Areeda's argument seems applicable to situations
involving LPGs. Instead of the explicit solicitation to fix prices,
484 U.S. 1067 (1988); International Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812
F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); see also PHILUIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUST LAW 1 839' (Supp. 1992) (discussing the two
cases).
238 See supra notes 168-86 and accompanying text. Actually, the conspiracy
provision in § 2 is even more onerous than the agreement requirement. This is
because proving a violation of the conspiracy provision requires both the same proof
needed to demonstrate an unreasonable restraint of trade and evidence of specific
intent to monopolize the market or restrain trade. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 36, 1 839'.
239 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1407(0, at 36.
240 See id. at 37.
241 See id.
242 See id.
243 Id.
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imagine that a price leader imposes an LPG and raises its posted
prices. This seems analogous to the solicitation in Areeda's
argument.244 Unfortunately, however, the price leader's solicita-
tion by adopting the LPG fails to imply the "specific intent"
provided in Areeda's example and demanded by section 2. This is
because the LPG offers offsetting benefits to buyers. Furthermore,
the price leader might lack any intent to monopolize; 245 the
adoption of the LPG could be motivated by a simple desire to
increase market share. As a result, the scenario fails to satisfy the
specific intent requirement required by section 2 doctrine.
In summary, Areeda's admittedly complex argument does not
ease the difficulties associated with prosecuting cartels utilizing
LPGs. This fact, combined with the previous observations concern-
ing the prohibitions against monopolizing and conspiring to
monopolize, means that section 2 of the Sherman Act, like sec-
tion 1, cannot be used to prosecute cartels that use LPGs.
D. Section 5 of the FTC Act
1. Statutory Wording and History
Although the Sherman Act provides a powerful weapon for
fighting overt price-fixing and monopolization, 246 its inability to
address tacit collusion cases is particularly troublesome. Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,247 however, offers a glim-
mer of hope that collusion facilitated by LPGs can be prevented, if
not punished. This section describes the history and current legal
status of section 5; the next section develops a practical approach
for using section 5 to reach inefficient outcomes caused by LPGs or
other forms of tacit collusion.
248
Section 5 of the FTC Act begins with a broad prohibition of
unfair methods of competition: "Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
244 Note that Areeda's discussion of an express solicitation takes place within the
context of his analysis of facilitating practices. See id. This suggests that Areeda
intended for his story to be generalized to include solicitations consisting of the
adoption of facilitating practices.
45 See id. (noting that MFNs are not analogous to the express solicitation
described in the Areeda example).
246 See 2 KINTNER, supra note 154, § 11.6 (noting that the Sherman Act "remedied
some of the deficiencies of the common law").
247 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
218 See infra part V.E.
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or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 249 This wording
is even broader than the all-encompassing provisions of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.250 The section has, in fact, been interpreted in
a very broad manner. For example, section 5 of the FTC Act has
incorporated the entire Sherman Act.25 1 As a result, any violation
of either section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act also constitutes
a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.252 In addition, section 5
can reach anticompetitive practices that are beyond the scope of
other antitrust laws if "they have or are likely to have a substantial
anticompetitive effect." 253 Section 5 differs from the Sherman
Act in other ways as well. For example, the remedies for violating
the Sherman Act include treble damages, large fines, and criminal
prosecution at the felony level.254 The FTC Act, in contrast, is
"wholly civil in nature." 255 As a result, it "invokes no criminal
sanctions or stigmas, occasions no private damages, and is brought
into play only by public authorities acting in the public inter-
est."
2 5 6
Because of these factors, section 5 of the FTC Act is particularly
well-suited for addressing facilitating practices and other forms of
tacit collusion.257 In fact, it has often successfully served this
purpose. In Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC,258 for example,
the Federal Trade Commission applied section 5 to stop a conspira-
cy facilitated by delivered pricing schemes. While the Commission
failed to find that two of the defendants were part of a conspiracy,
it still prohibited them from using delivered pricing by declaring
such schemes unfair methods of competition. 259 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC's decision and seemed to support
249 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
250 See supra text accompanying note 156.
251 See 7 EARL W. KINTNER & WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
§ 48.22 (1988).
252 See id.
253 EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO ANTITRUST AND TRADE
REGULATION LAWS FOR BUSINESSMEN 23 (2d ed. 1973).
254 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 15 (1988); see also KINTNER, supra note 253, at 151 (noting
that § 4 of the Clayton Act provides recovery of treble damages for a person bringing
suit under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
255 KINTNER, supra note 253, at 24.
256 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436(c), at 243.
257 See id. (noting that "no one is to blame" for the adoption of some facilitating
practices).
258 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
59 See Rigid Steel Conduit Ass'n, 38 F.T.C. 534, 593-96 (1944).
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its claim that mere conscious parallelism violated section 5 of the
FTC Act.26° Triangle Conduit and cases that followed suggested
that section 5 did not require the evidence of agreement demanded
by the Sherman Act.
2 6 1
2. The du Pont Litigation
Buoyed by its previous successes, in 1979 the Federal Trade
Commission launched an investigation of manufacturers of lead-
based antiknock gasoline additives in an effort to determine
whether prices were at supracompetitive levels.262 The industry
appeared to present a good environment for collusion,263 and the
FTC suspected that various practices were in fact being used to
facilitate tacit collusion.2 64  In particular, the FTC noted the
parallel use of delivered pricing, MFNs, contracts requiring thirty
days advance notice of price changes, and press releases announcing
price changes. 65 The FTC did not charge that the defendants
had any agreement to raise prices; instead, the Commission claimed
that the previously listed practices "'individually and in combination
had the effect of reducing uncertainty about competitors' prices of
lead-based antiknock compounds,' and that such reduced uncertain-
ty 'unfairly facilitated the maintenance of substantial, uniform price
levels and the reduction or elimination of price competition.'"
266
Though the FTC prevailed before an administrative law judge,
who enjoined the questionable practices,2 67 the defendants won
on appeal. 268 The decision handed down by the Second Circuit,
260 See Triangle Conduit, 168 F.2d at 181; see also 6 AREEDA, supra note 54,
1 1436(c), at 244 n.15 (citing an FTC internal memo that declared parallel adoption
of basing point pricing schemes illegal).
261 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436(c) (noting that § 5 does not contain a
conspiracy requirement).
212 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1984).
263 The industry was highly concentrated; in fact, it was comprised of only four
firms. See id. at 130-31. In addition, prices were highly inelastic, the product was
homogeneous, and the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory changes
requiring the use of unleaded gasoline meant that potential entrants would not find
investing in plant and equipment worthwhile enough to enter the industry. See id. at
131-32.
264 The fact that two of the firms in the industry, Ethyl and du Pont, earned
returns on investment substantially exceeding 150% of the average rate of return for
the chemical industry provided circumstantial evidence of collusion. See id. at 132.
265 See id. at 133.
266 Id. (quoting the FTC complaint).
267 See id. at 134.
268 See id. at 141-42.
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however, has been widely criticized, both because it found for the
defendants despite ample evidence of collusive pricing and because
of the harsh standard it established for enjoining facilitating
practices.269 In particular, the court stated that, absent evidence
of an agreement, conduct must exhibit "some indicia of oppressive-
ness," such as evidence of anticompetitive intent, or the absence of
an independent business reason for the conduct, in order to be
prohibited by section 5 of the FTC Act.2 70 Clearly, this language
echoes the elements associated with meeting the various require-
ments of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
271
E. A Proposal for Reaching LPGs
As indicated earlier, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act seem
incapable of eliminating tacit collusion facilitated by LPGs.
272
The du Pont opinion seems to suggest that section 5 of the FTC Act
now suffers the same infirmity.273  Despite the restrictions im-
plied by du Pont, however, the FTC Act still provides a practical
method of reaching collusion inspired by LPGs.
In fact, section 5 of the FTC Act remains the best weapon for
eliminating collusion resulting from facilitating practices. Even
after du Pont, section 5 still incorporates both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 2 74 and offers a method of prohibiting collusive
conduct without assigning blame, criminal liability, or inviting suits
to recover private damages.27 5  In essence, the only significant
factor changed by du Pont appears to be that in cases where the
plaintiff cannot show an agreement among the defendants, the
plaintiff must now provide evidence of either anticompetitive intent
or the lack of an independent business justification for the facilitat-
ing practices.
276
Given these requirements, there are two approaches that would
permit section 5 to reach collusion inspired by LPGs. First, the
Simons approach discussed before could be utilized in a modified
form. Specifically, the existence of LPGs that are being exercised
269 See; e.g., 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436 (noting that the court's decision
confined the reach of § 5).
270 Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139.
271 See supra notes 168-86, 234-45 and accompanying text.
272 See supra parts V.B & V.C.
273 Note that the du Pont holding is only binding in the Second Circuit.
274 See KINTNER, supra note 253, at 23.
275 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1 1436(c).
276 See supra text accompanying note 270.
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by consumers could be held to constitute vertical agreements
satisfying the agreement requirement set forth in du Pont. Note that
once this requirement is met, the du Pont opinion no longer
requires the plaintiff to show that the facilitating practices are
contrary to the economic self-interest of the actor or that the actor
was motivated by a specific intent to collude.277 Of course this
policy does not provide a foolproof method of preventing collusion
through LPGs, since LPGs can only be considered legally binding
agreements if they are being activated by consumers. 278 This
modified Simons approach, however, does correct one of the flaws
neglected by Simons. Simons relied on the Sherman Act, which
subjected violators to criminal prosecution and treble damages. As
a result, actors might have been over-deterred; efficient uses of
facilitating practices might have been curtailed as sellers sought to
avoid exposure to the large penalties imposed by Sherman Act
liability.27 9 Modifying the Simons analysis to use the FTC Act, in
contrast, avoids any potential for over-deterrence since violators are
simply enjoined from engaging in the facilitating practices and are
not exposed to huge damage awards or criminal sanctions. Though
this approach does not reach collusive equilibria already established
by LPGs, it could prevent such outcomes in the first place.
A second method for reaching mechanisms for facilitating tacit
collusion with section 5 follows from the majority's opinion in du
Pont. The opinion was motivated by a desire to prevent the FTC
from abusing the power granted to it under section 5.28o In
particular, the court rejected the FTC's standard of applying section
5, which would have prohibited the use of various facilitating
practices when their cumulative effect lessened competition.
281
The court's denial was premised on the belief that allowing this
vague standard would create great uncertainty among businesses as
to which conduct is illegal. The court noted, for example, that
many of the practices accused of facilitating tacit collusion were
adopted years before the FTC found them illegal. 28 2 "The tenu-
ousness of the Commission's finding that the challenged practices
277 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text. Note, however, that antitrust
violations may be found without a legally binding contract. See supra note 221.
279 See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
280 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248 (1972)).
281 See id. at 141.
282 See id. at 140.
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are 'unfair' is illustrated by the fact that it does not tell us when the
practices became unlawful .... 23 Furthermore, the court
rejected the FTC's standard because under it "[c]ertain otherwise-
legitimate practices were declared unlawful only when used
cumulatively with other practices." 28 4 For these reasons, the court
found that the FTC's standard of application constituted "uncertain
guesswork rather than workable rules of law."
28 5
While scholars have suggested that the du Pont court overesti-
mated the costs imposed on businesses by a vague standard of
applying section 5,286 these costs were very real to the court. This
suggests that a standard of applying section 5 that minimizes these
costs would be more acceptable. Fortunately, various features of
LPGs suggest that they can be regulated in a manner that leaves
little uncertainty. First, the independent use of LPGs is more
effective at facilitating collusion than several other facilitating
practices used in concert.28 7 Second, LPGs can be used to inspire
collusion in a wide variety of market structures, including competi-
tive markets.28 8  Finally, the offsetting benefits associated with
LPGs can be provided by other less collusive facilitating practic-
es.
289
These features suggest that LPGs should be prohibited entire-
ly.290 Although at first glance a total prohibition on LPGs might
seem harsh, in reality, firms would retain wide latitude in adopting
pricing policies. In particular, since this Comment defines "low-
price guarantee" to include only those pricing policies that refund
more than 100% of price differences, 291 even a total prohibition
of LPGs would not prevent firms from offering both meeting-the-
competition clauses and most-favored-nation clauses. As a result,
although sellers could no longer promise to refund 110% of the
283 Id.
284 Id. at 139.
285 Id.
286 See 6 AREEDA, supra note 54, 1436(c). The court's concern seems particularly
overdrawn because du Pont involved the FTC Act and not the Sherman Act. At worst,
the defendants could have been enjoined from continuing the facilitating practices;
monetary damages and criminal sanctions were never an issue.
287 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
289 See supra part III.C.
290 This Comment does not address whether the FTC could ban LPGs under its
rulemaking power pursuant to § 5 of the FTC Act or if new legislation would be
needed to accomplish this task.
291 See supra part I.A.
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difference between their price and the prices charged by their
competitors, each seller could guarantee buyers that they are being
charged a price no higher than the lowest price charged to any
other customer. Furthermore, each seller could promise to match
any lower price posted by its rivals. Though such MCCs and MFNs
may have anticompetitive effects, 292 these pricing policies are less
likely to lead to suipracompetitive prices than are LPGs.29 3 In
addition, allowing MCCs and MFNs ensures that the efficiency-
enhancing aspects of these policies are still available to the
marketplace.
294
While a total prohibition of LPGs would not be very onerous,
the anticompetitive potential of LPGs could be limited by more
narrow means. Specifically, recall that the collusive potential of
LPGs is greatest in industries with certain features.295 Therefore,
the FTC could monitor the use of LPGs and only challenge
applications in industries with these features. As long as the FTC
clearly specifies the conditions under which LPGs will be held in
violation of section 5, the cost to businesses created by legal
uncertainty should be kept to the minimal level demanded by the
majority in du Pont.
So, although the du Pont opinion certainly complicates efforts to
stop collusion through facilitating practices, the collusive impact of
LPGs could be minimized under either of two approaches using
section 5 of the FTC Act. The first relies on a modified version of
the Simons theory that vertical contracts can satisfy the agreement
requirement. The second approach attempts to address the du Pont
majority's concern for costs generated by legal uncertainty.
Although neither of these methods provides an ideal solution for
preventing anticompetitive uses of LPGs, they are superior to any
attempt to reach LPGs through the Sherman Act.
292 See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
293 See supra part IV.B.2.
294 See supra part IILC (detailing the offsetting efficiencies provided by
interdependent pricing policies).
21' See supra part IV.C.2 (noting that the collusive potential of LPGs is greatest in
industries with inelastic demand, price flexibility, frequent sales transactions,
widespread use of advertising, one or more well-capitalized firms, economies of scale,
and the ability to prevent vertical dissipation of profits).
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CONCLUSION
While competitive markets maximize consumer welfare, the
positive economic profits associated with successful collusion create
a strong incentive for firms to form cartels. Any cartel, however,
must overcome several very difficult tasks to succeed. The adoption
of various facilitating practices, however, can simplify these tasks.
In particular, the institution of a low-price guarantee by a single
firm in even a competitive industry can set in motion a chain of
events that raises prices and profits to supracompetitive levels.
Furthermore, the collusive equilibrium established by a low-price
guarantee can continue to exist even in the long term, since it fixes
the market size, forcing potential entrants to steal market share
from existing firms. While collusive uses of LPGs are difficult to
prohibit under current antitrust laws, two methods of applying
section 5 of the FTC Act can be utilized to curtail or prevent any
anticompetitive impact. In the meantime, courts, scholars, and
policy makers should continue to scrutinize innovative pricing
policies like LPGs which might have anticompetitive implications.
